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INTRODUCTION

It is

for

much

hypothesized that the salient open occupancy issue accounted
variance in electoral preference in the 1966 Maryland Guber-

of the

We propose

natorial Election.

to validate this assertion

by

(1)

establishing

the existence of definite attitudes on integrated housing and political

representation of such attitudes

(2)

verbal and quantitative analysis

of

candidates' campaigns and voter support in the primary and general election,

and

(3)

analysis of the place occupied by the open occupancy issue in

the campaign and the degree to which
this election.

it

An aggregate evaluation

economic areas, we

feel, will

determined electoral preference

of the election data

in

by counties and

permit a valid conclusion that this civil rights

issue significantly affected voter preference.

One

final note.

presentation,
in

Given the significance

of the

term "salient"

feel obliged to briefly inform the reader as to the context

we

which the term

is utilized.

In referring to an issue as salient,

that a particular concern is most prominent and relevant

voters, relative to other topics.

Behavior
to

,

in this

Brodbeck and Burdick,

we imply

among groups
in

of

American Voting

suggest that voters devote more "attention," "time," and "interest

such issues.

"Salient issues are connected with the success, survival,

purpose, or major goals of the group, and therefore the most
is

attached to them.

" A

So that we refer

political

to this brief description

above source in categorizing the term "salient" throughout

weight

by the

this thesis.

•^Burdick & Brodbeck (ed.) American Voting Behavior, pgs. 170-171
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CHAPTER

I

ATTITUDES ON INTEGRATED HOUSING
The purpose

of

Chapter One

establish the potential salient and

is to

controversial nature of open occupancy.
investigation as to whether
exist and

Samples

(2)

(1)

Analysis of this topic requires

definite attitudes on integrated housing

whether politicans correctly perceive such attitudes.

of both

Where the

suburban and non-suburban
initial investigation is

attitudes are considered.

concerned,

it

may be

of

assistance to

briefly determine what suburbanites like about the suburbs, and by implication,

why

certain attitudes on open occupancy exist.

state that "the

suburban resident has chosen

offers him the highest housing value for

Nina and Claude Gruen

his present location because

which he

feels he

wants

this housing value includes (not only) physical shelter, space,

to

pay.

.

and comfort,

but a host of social, environmental, and public services that are attached
the suburban location he has chosen to live in."*

it

to

This observation was

supported by a Miami Valley Regional Planning Commission study, where

suburban residents were asked
tion of their

to specify

major factors influencing selec-

home. Thirty-four percent cited proximity

to

work, friends,

school, or other institution; 32% mentioned factors associated with the social

makeup

of the

neighborhood.

Familiarity with the neighborhood, the

1

2

prestige 01 exclusiveness of the area, and the type of people living
location
In

were the most frequently specified
depth investigation

of

at the

social factors.

what suburbanites

like about the

suburbs

would require a complex socio-economic analysis. At best, what we have
presented

is

a surface evaluation of the subject.

Yet an in-depth discussion

of this particular topic is not our specific concern, but is only intended to

serve as an introduction

to definite

suburban attitudes existent on open

occupancy

The Miami Valley Regional Planning Commission

in 1970 investigated

attitudes toward racial integration in the Dayton, Ohio Metropolitan Area 0
(i.e.

,

Dayton and

its

immediate suburbs)

.

Respondent categories

Commission's questionnaire on the desirability

grouped

into low

of integration

to the

were sub-

income white families without a husband, low income

white families with a husband, low income black families without a husband,

low income black families with a husband, moderate income white families
without a husband, moderate income white families with a husband, moderate

income black families without a husband, and moderate income black families
(The sub-categories

with a husband.

of

"husband" and "no husband"

have particular sociological implications as seen by the Commission, and are
not especially relevant to our study of attitudes on open occupancy as a
political issue

.

)

3

Where

attitudes toward racial integration

were concerned, both low

and moderate income whites preferred segregation between the
races, as
reported by the findings of the Miami Valley Regional Planning
Commission;
(figures recorded are 64% and 67% respectively)

whites (where no husband was present)

NOTE: The Commission reported

,

.

Low and moderate income

preferred segregation by only 33%.

that an integrated neighborhood

perceived, by husband-less white families, as more tolerant
hold; hence, only a 33% rate of preferred segregation.

the

mean average

and moderate income blacks (with husband
32% and 12% respectively

,

,

is

in the family)

advocated segregation.

such a house-

Most significant,

of whites that preferred segregation (i.e.

moderate white families, with and without husbands)

of

was

,

low and

49.2%.

Where low

are concerned,

Low income blacks, where

no husband was present, advocated segregation in residential areas by

moderate income blacks (where no husband was present)
tion

by 100%. The mean average

integration

is

of

,

33%;

advocated integra-

blacks that prefer segregation and

19.2% and 80 .7% respectively

.

Very importantly,

this analysis

indicates the disparity between blacks and whites on attitudes toward the
desirability of integration in housing (where whites favor integration by
slightly over 50%

whites

and blacks by almost 81%. Segregation

at a rate of 49.2%,

is

favored by

and by blacks, 19.2%.

A second study conducted by

the Miami Valley Regional Planning

4

Commission (MVRPC) investigated attitudes
varied SES-demographic backgrounds.
city

suburbanites from four,

"Suburban Area One " 4

is a

surrounded by farmland, outside the main metropolitan county.

the lowest median family income of

house value.
It

of

is a fairly

all

"Suburban Area Two"

small
It

has

four areas, and the lowest median

is

geographically far from the city.

prosperous and rapidly growing community, virtually

all

white, and desirous of maintaining a suburban, low density, residential
0

environment.

The population consists primarily

class households.
It

is

an

"Suburban Area Three"

is

of

middle and working

the richest of the four suburbs.

white area, with the highest family income and house value.

all

"Suburban Area Four"
black families

who can

is a

black suburban area attracted by well-to-do

afford to

move from

the center of the city.

So that

the sample of suburban attitudes reflects this cross-section of varied back-

grounds

.

Yet the statistical findings compiled by the
significant differences in attitudes

,

MVRPC

do not reflect

relative to the four sampled

Principal authors Nina and Claude Gruen,

in

suburbs

analyzing the Commission's

findings, state that "similarity of responses between the four areas was
startling.

cantly

"
.

^

.

.averages (on attitudes toward integration) did not differ signifi-

5

Investigation cf suburban reactions to the migration of low and
moderate income

groups reveals (what can well be interpreted

"racial bias"

among suburban dwellers. Categories

were divided

into the following:

a)

b)
c)

d)
e)
f)

g)
h)
i)

j)

k)
l)

as)

,

a strong

of potential

migrants

low income elderly white
low income elderly black
low income physically handicapped white
low income physically handicapped black
low income white family with husband
low income black family with husband
low income white family without husband
low income black family without husband
moderate income white family with husband
moderate income white family without husband
moderate income black family with husband
moderate income black family without husband
If

racial bias

were not

a significant factor in the determination of

suburbanite acceptance or rejection

we would expect

of migration into their

neighborhoods,

relatively similar types of reaction to the prospects of both

low income black families with husband and low income white families with

husband, as well as moderate income black families without husband and
moderate income white families without husband, and low income white
elderly acceptance or rejection to be similar to that of low income black
elderly, etc.

Yet where a hypothetical migration level was set

where the suburban resident was asked
comprised

of a particular

group)

,

at

5% (i.e.

his reaction to 5% of the area being

five of six black

while one of six white groups was rejected.

groups were rejected

Authors Nina and Claude Gruen

6

report that,

"

.

.

.suburbanites show a strong racial bias:

In almost

every

instance, the black household with husband (for
example) was less accept-

able than the white household without

b
.

[Average score definitions

(reflecting responses of resident suburbanites)

mission where 1.00

to

were formulated by the Com-

2.49 indicated an acceptance of a given group; 2.50 to

3.50, a tolerant acceptance; 3.51 to 5.00, a rejection of particular group

migration into the suburbs

No group received

at the

5% level.

]

a score indicative of outright acceptance.

However,

the moderate income white family, with husband, received the highest

neutral score (tolerant acceptance)

accepted group.

band

(a

,

of 3.07,

and therefore was the most

Second, was the moderate income white family without hus-

neutral score of 3. IS); third, the low income white elderly

(a

neutral score of 3.23); fourth, the moderate income black family with hus-

band

(the

only black group receiving a neutral score— 3

income white physically handicapped
low income white family with husband

(a

(a

.31)

fifth,

low

neutral score of 3.33); sixth, the
neutral score of 3.46); seventh,

the moderate income black family without husband

negative score-rejec-

(a

tion-of 3.53); eighth, the low income black elderly

(a

negative score of

3.55); ninth, the low income physically handicapped black
of 3.57); tenth, the

;

(a

negative score

low income white family without husband (3.64);

eleventh, the low income black family with husband

(a

rejection rate of

7

3.67); and lastly, the low income black family without
husband
rate of 3.91)

.

RANK ORDER GROUPS ACCEPTED

2

3

4

5

6

rejection

So that a rank order of groups accepted (receiving neutral

scores) and groups rejected (receiving negative scores)

1

(a

in realizing that

(a)

appears as follows:

RANK ORDER GROUPS R ET ECTED

moderate income whites
(families with husbands)
moderate income whites
(families without husbands)
low income white elderly
moderate income blacks
(families with husbands)
low income whites
(physically handicapped)
low income whites
(families with husbands)

The aforementioned

,

12 low

income blacks

(families without husbands)
low income blacks
(families with husbands)
10 low income whites
(families without husbands)
9 low income blacks
11

8
7

(physically handicapped
low income black elderly
moderate income blacks
(families without husbands)

suburban attitudes seems apparent

racial bias of

while moderate income white families without husbands

are accepted, their black counterparts, i.e.

without husbands, are not;

(b)

moderate income black families

while low income elderly whites are accepted,

their black counterparts are not;

(c)

while low income physically handi-

capped whites are accepted, low income physically handicapped blacks are
not;

(d)

while low income white families with husbands are accepted, low

income blacks

in this category are not accepted.

In order to further establish the validity of our assertion that racial

bias appears to be evident

where integrated housing

among
is

the responses given by suburbanites,

concerned

.

a study of group rejection rates,

8

holding "low income" (income less than $5000) constant

is

proposed,

followed by the utilization of the identical technique where
moderate income

groups are concerned.

It is

discovered, via the survey on attitudes

of the

suburbanite, that 55% of these respondents listed low income blacks as

"among the

least preferred"

(note that this

group where suburban migration was concerned;

group consists

of

low income black families, with and without

husbands, low income black elderly, and low income black physically handicapped)
as

Thirty-one percent

.

among the

cerned

.

least preferred

of these

respondents listed low income whites

group where suburban migration was con-

Nineteen percent of suburban residents named moderate income

blacks as among the least preferred groups while 5% listed moderate income

whites in this category.

NOTE:

Moderate income

is

$5000 to $10000.

and Claude Gruen make several comments which relate directly

"The survey brought

ings.

into the

open the.

.

.conflict

to

7

Nina

our find-

between the middle

class ideal that everyone is equally acceptable and the attitude that those

who

differ

may be harmful

to the

middle class neighborhood."

g

Mention

several respondents' comments on integrated housing lend support

Gruen observation. Stated one suburban
give

all

"I

with

in

all

suburbia commented:
kinds

of

"It

to the

don't want people

night parties or receive welfare checks living next door

A housewife
to live

resident:

of

would be beneficial

for

to

me."

who

9

my daughter

people as long as they had the same ideals and were

9

neat and clean."

1

We suggest, very simply

for the

moment,

that these

types of suburban attitudes (indicated via the inflated rejection
rates

lower and moderate income blacks

,

of

relative to whites in the identical cate-

gory) have implications for the issue of open occupancy politically.

As

a

consequence

integrated housing,
for

it

of evaluating particular

appears essential

suburban

to briefly

attitudes on

suggest possible "reasons"

such attitudes. An educated assumption would be that reasons for these

specific feelings are closely related to those factors (previously mentioned)
that attract one to the suburbs; i.e.

may be perceived

the presence of integrated housing

as a threat to the "prestige or exclusiveness of the neigh-

borhood," and "housing value,
social, environmental,

in both the physical

sense and

and public services".^ Indeed.,

in

terms

a study cf

of

suburban

respondents' reasons for considering low and moderate income households

undesirable neighbors (and by implication, lower income blacks in particular given our previous

analysis) appears to reflect a perceived need to

protect stated attractions of suburbia.

The Miami Valley Regional Planning
1

Commission reports the below findings:

1

0

55% perceived a drop in property

values; 59% of suburban residents feared that migration by certain groups

would result

in a

decrease in housing maintenance and general housing

conditions; 43% envisioned a decrease in law and order; 40% indicated that
the neighborhood would become less stable (i.e.

a

decrease in social

status and neighborhood organization); 38% perceived a drop in quality of

10

schools and 36% envisioned an increase in property taxes due to
the need for

increased sei vices.

So that a rank order of "reasons

11

for considering low

and moderate income groups undesirable neighbors, particularly the black
lower income groups

(as

perceived by suburbanites) are:

decrease in housing maintenance
drop in property values
decrease in law and order
decrease in stability of neighborhood
drop in quality of schools
increase in property taxes due to need for increase in services

1)

2)

3)
4)
5)

6)

Heretofore,

housing

we have

limited discussion of attitudes on integrated

the suburbs, primarily.

to

A

national study

non-suburban areas) conducted by the Division

of

(of

both suburbs and

Behavioral Sciences

of

the National Research Council supports the findings of the Miami Valley

Regional Planning Commission.

Five basic questions relating

to attitudes

on integrated housing were asked nationally of a white sample.

me

you personally would or would not object
family as your next door neighbor
1)

.

.

.tell

if

The question was submitted

in

August

of 1966;

to:

having a black

51% of the white sample

indicated they would object to the entry of blacks into their neighborhood

NOTE:

49 2% objected to integration (among whites) in the Dayton survey.
.

Would you move
neighborhood?
2)

if

black people came

The question was submitted

to live in

in July of 1966;

indicated they would move in such a case.

great numbers in your

70% of the white sample

11

White people have a right to keep blacks out of their neighborhoods
3)
they want, and blacks should respect that right.

The question was submitted

in April of 1968;

if

54% of the white sample

agreed with the above statement.
4)

Would you favor

a Federal law forbidding discrimination in housing

against blacks?

The question was submitted

in

October

of 1966;

51% of the white sample

indicated they would oppose such a law.

your own words, what

is "open occupancy" -what does this term mean?
the respondent's definition of open housing was fairly accurate
(as judged by the surveyors)
the additional question was asked: Would
you like to see Congress pass or reject an open housing bill?
5)

In

NOTE;

If

,

The question was submitted
tion of

open housing.

in April of 1967;

39% had a correct concep-

Fifty-four percent of this group indicated that Con-

gress should reject such a

bill.

The above attitudes appear

to reflect

degrees

of racial bias vis-a-vis

the issue of housing (as noted by Nina and Claude Gruen)
the National Research Council indicates

gated housing among whites

(b)

(a)

.

The study

^

of

a significant desire for segre-

majority opposition, among whites, to open

housing legislation.

Given the above conclusion

,

it

is

important

to

contrast white attitudes

on integrated housing with black attitudes on the subject.
sive evaluation of black opinion

is

While an exclu-

not possible on the suburban level,

given our sources, such an analysis on a national level

(i.e

,

a

12

consideration of both suburban and non-suburban areas)

possible via

is

the National Research Council study. 15 Questions asked of the black sample

were:

Would you personally prefer to live in a neighborhood with all blacks,
1)
mostly blacks, mostly whites, or a neighborhood that is mixed half and half?

The question submitted

in the winter of 1968, 48% (five times greater

than any other response except for "no difference") indicated a preference
for

"mixed

half

and half." NOTE:

This opinion may be contrasted with

A

questions one and two previously asked of the white sample.

half

black, half white ratio, as suggested by blacks in answering the above question, could possibly be interpreted as the

numbers" as noted

in question

presence

two where 70%

of the

indicated they would relocate in such a situation

.

of

blacks in "great

white respondents

The point

is that conflict-

ing opinions over the desirability of integrated housing apparently exist

between the races
2)

to.

property should not have to sell to blacks
(sample taken from blacks residing in Detroit)

An owner

of

The question was submitted

in

sample disagreed with this statement.

if

September, 1968; 54%

he doesn't want

of the

(This opinion

black

may be

contrast-

ed with question three submitted to white respondents, where 54% indicated

and that
that whites have a right to keep blacks out of their neighborhoods

13

blacks should respect that right.) Again, our purpose for comparison

of

attitudes is to stress the differing opinions of blacks and whites over the

issue of housing

Which do you think is more important now: to get more and better
housing, in and around where blacks live already, or to open housing
blacks in other parts of the city and suburbs?
3)

The question was submitted

in

September

of 1968;

for

44% of the black

sample indicated a preference for more and better housing yet a significant
41% stated that interracial housing was more important; 14% said both were
"equally vital."

NOTE: Clearly

housing (41% plus 14%)

.

who oppose open housing

a majority of blacks favor, at least, open

This contrasts with the opinion

of

white respondents

legislation and presumably, open housing (given

white attitudes on segregation)

.

No direct question concerning federal

legislation to assure integrated housing

was asked

of

blacks in the National

Research Council study. We make a major assumption here

that since blacks

favor open occupancy, they favor for the most part, legislation
its

to

enforce

prospects

A major conclusion, then,
integrated housing do exist.

is that definite racially

A study by

the Miami Valley Regional Planning

Commission indicates significant preference

for segregated housing

whites in the Dayton, Ohio Metropolitan A.rea.

white suburban attitudes appear

to

related attitudes on

Via a second

MVRPC

be characterized by racial bias.

among
survey,
Five

14

of six black

groups studied were perceived as "undesirable neighbors"

while five of six white groups were perceived as

at least tolerable.

On

the

national level, white attitudes were distinguished, also,
by significant

preference for segregated housing.

A survey

of black opinion

that a majority of this

grams designed
neighborhoods)

to

.

by the National Research Council indicated

group favored open housing (but also favored pro-

increase the quality and quantity of housing in black

So that definite, conflicting opinions on the desirability

of

integrated housing exist between blacks and whites.

Next,
cians.

we want

The assertion

to investigate the attitudes

is

and perceptions

of politi-

that these public officials correctly perceive the

attitudes of their constituents and therefore are representative of such
attitudes.

If

this

assumption proves valid, conflicting views on integrated

housing have the potential of being politically relevant

such ambiguity will suffice)

(for the

moment,

(The investigation of politicians'

.

atti-

tudes and perceptions relative to those of their constituents, and the ulti-

mate representative nature of the former's behavior,

MVRPC suburban

analysis

politicians' attitudes

.

)

We make

is

based upon the

a major, educated assumption that

and perceptions vis-a-vis non-suburban whites and

black constituents are likewise respectively representative.

15

The basis

for the stated "educated assumption" is a study conducted

by Miller and Stokes

entitled Constituency Influe nce in Concrress

authors suggest that congressional representation

of

constituency

.

^

is

The
a mix-

ture between the Burkean model (which places the congressman in the role
of representing

CONSTITUENT INTERESTS)

(where the congressman responds directly

ENT)

,

,

the instructed-delegate model

WILL OF THE CONSTITU-

to the

and the responsible party model (where a NATIONAL CONSTITUENCY

overshadows the

local electorate)

.

Theoretically, the greatest degree of

constituent "control" over the congressman
stated models

.

is

with the second of the three

Given the Miller and Stokes study

of

three major issue areas,

i.e., foreign affairs, social welfare, and civil rights, the latter issue

category was found to be representative of the instructed-delegate model
(the other

two issue areas were found indicative

of the

other stated models)

Specifically, the representative's roll call behavior
sistent with the constituency's attitudes (either

due

to

.

was most con-

an identical attitude

by the congressman or the representative's correct perception

of the

electorate's attitude) on the issue of civil rights-as opposed to social welfare

policy or foreign affairs.

In

an analysis which correlated constituency

attitude with the representative's perception of that attitude, the rate of

association was .53, compared to .19 and .17 for foreign affairs and social

welfare policy respectively

16

So that our previously stated educated assumption that politicians,
general, are representative of their constituents where open
occupany
the issue,

is

based upon the theme

of the Miller

in

is

and Stokes study. Yet

in

conclusion, utilization of this analysis makes another assumption; that the
issue of open occupancy

is

a civil rights question.

In the study conducted

were surveyed from three
Areas;

"

by the MVRPC,

of the four

politicians and public officials

previously mentioned "Suburban

the black suburban region being excluded.

Several basic findings

emerge: 17
politicians tended to represent the attitudes of their constituents rather
than not
1)

2)

politicians' attitudes

were not dependent upon

their particular role in

government or their jurisdiction
directly related to the initial finding, the majority of the public officials,
whether elected or appointed, were knowledgeable concerning the attitudes
3)

and preferences of their^constituents and the majority were willing to
incorporate these desires into their policy and program formulations
Analysis of public officials' projections
to

of their constituents reactions

low and moderate income households comprising less than 10%

communities indicates the following:

husband

is

of their

the moderate income white family with

perceived as most acceptable (67% of surveyed politicians

believed that suburbanites would accept this group); second most acceptable,
as perceived by public officials

is

the low income white elderly group (61%)

third, the low income white physically handicapped (50%); fourth, the

17

moderate income black family with husband

(42%); fifth, the

moderate income

white family without husband and the low income white family with husband
(39% respectively); sixth, the low income black physically handicapped
(18%); seventh, low

income black family with husband

(17%);

eighth, the

low income black elderly (11%); ninth, the low income white family without

husband

(10%); tenth, the

(6%); eleventh, the

order comparison

moderate income black family without husband

low income black family without husband

(0%)

.

A rank

of politicians' projections of constituents' attitudes with

actual attitudes of suburbanites is illustrated below:

PUBLIC OFFICIALS PROJECTIONS
moderate income white families

1)

with husband

low income white elderly
low income white physically
3)
handicapped
moderate income black families
4)
with husband
moderate income white families
5)
without husband
low income white families
6)
with husband
low income black physically
7)
handicapped
iow income black families
8)
with husband
low income black elderly
9
10) low income white families
without husband
11) moderate income black

2)

(

families without

husband

12) low income black families
without husband

ACTUAL SUBURBAN ATTITUDES
moderate income white families
with husband
moderate income white families
2)
1)

without husband
low income white elderly
3)
moderate income black families
4)
with husband
low income white physically
5)

handicapped
low income white families
6)
with husband
moderate income black families
7)
without husband
low income black elderly
8)
low income black physically
9)

handicapped
10) low income white families
without husband
11) low income black families with
husband
12) low income black families
without husband
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Of the six groups perceived as least acceptable by public
in anticipation of constituents

black individuals

(i.e.

1

officials,

reactions, five such croups consisted of

low income physically handicapped blacks, low

income black families, with and without husbands, moderate income blacks
without husbands in the family, and low income black elderly)
of the six

groups perceived as most acceptable by politicians,

tion of constituents' reactions, five of such

individuals (i.e.

groups consisted

Likewise,

.

in anticipa-

of

white

moderate income white families with husbands, low

income white elderly, low income white physically handicapped, moderate
income white families without husbands, and low income white families with
husbands)

.

THE IDENTICAL PATTERN PERSISTS WHERE ACTUAL SUBURB-

ANITE ATTITUDES ARE CONCERNED. There appears

to

be definite racial

(and also class) bias where suburban attitudes and perceptions by suburban
politicians relate to integrated housing

.

Both blacks and the lower income

(By

categories are considered least desirable suburban neighbors.
implication, the lower income black,

unwelcomed

into the

all

other variables negated,

is

suburban community. Further investigation

the most

illustrates

the similarity between actual attitudes of suburbanites vis-a-vis integrated

housing and the perceptions

of the politician.)

Concerning suburban

tudes, again, the black moderate income family with husband

group receiving a neutral (interpreted as "tolerant") score;

is

atti-

the sole

this

same group
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is

perceived by suburban politicians as the most acceptable among black

groups

We

indicated a bias against lower income groups (and blacks) in the

suburbs. Where both the actual attitudes

of the

suburban dweller and per-

ceptions of the politician in suburbia are studied, five of the six lowest
rated groups (those groups rejected)

,

were lower income groups. Four

these rejected, lower income groups consisted of black individuals.
point

is that

Our

the perceptions of politicians in relation to the acceptability

certain groups'

movement

of

of

suburbs, accurately reflects, what can be

into the

interpreted as, the racially and class biased attitudes of the suburban resident.

One

final

comparative analysis will lend support

The suburbanites' "reasons"

politician.

observation

for considering low income and black house-

holds as undesirable neighbors

by the

to this

contrasted with such factors as perceived

is

Close inspection indicates that of the six most "significant"

reasons cited by suburbanites for labelling groups as undesirable, tive such
factors are perceived by the suburban politician.

cance

is

(Degree

of signifi-

determined by percent suburban respondents and percent suburban

politicians that cited particular reasons for the perception of groups as
,

unacceptable.

)

These iactors

are:

IP
-
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1)

a drop in property values (50%)

2)

race (50%)

3)

decrease in quality of schools (47%)
increase in property taxes due to need for increased social services
decrease in law and order (28%)
decrease in housing maintenance (25%)

4)
5)
6)

NOTE:

See

The

list of

was

by the suburban resident

sole, significant reason stated

citing certain

cian,

factors cited

by suburbanites as

a factor in

groups undesirable, which was not recognized by the

"the decrease in the stability of the neighborhood."

response from public

officials

(28%)

(50%)

,

indicating

why

Yet a key

particular groups

might be unwelcomed in suburbia, was "race." This response
significant given the fact that the

politi-

is

especially

answer was not directly on the Miami

Valley Regional Planning Commission questionnaire but was a "write-in;

"

note that "race" was not a significant response category where suburbanites

were concerned
Analysis of the implications of "neighborhood stability" indicates a
close similarity with race as a factor in labelling a group as an undesirable

neighbor.

The term, as authors Nina and Claude Gruen

the migration of (as one suburban dweller noted)

,

"people that would be a

bad influence cn my family," and "people that would not
of the

community.

1

'
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is

fit

in with the rest

Given the "suburban bias," previously noted, the

above statements appear
sensus

stated, implied

to

have possible racial implications

apparent between the suburban response

of

.

So that con-

'neighborhood

21

stability"

and the politicians' race response.

In conclusion,

we have attempted

to illustrate that

suburban

politi-

cians correctly perceive, and represent the attitudes of their suburban
constituents where integrated housing

is

concerned. When particular

tudes of the suburban dweller were investigated, definite patterns

atti-

of bias

against lower income and black individuals appeared to exist (again, the
implications of racial bias are more important given the emphasis of our

study on open occupancy-as opposed

made

to class bias)

non-suburban white and black

that

.

A major assumption

is

politicians correctly perceive and

represent the attitudes of their constituents as the suburban

MVRPC

indicated of suburban politicians; to support this assumption

we

study

utilized

the Miller and Stokes analysis.
In

1)

sum, these points emerge:

Suburbanites have definite attitudes on integrated housing as do white,

non-suburban dwellers and blacks

(the

Miami Valley Regional Planning

Commission study, analyzed by Nina and Claude Gruen and the National
Research Council study indicate
white individuals)
into their

2)

,

this)

.

Suburbanites (by implication,

and non-suburban whites are reluctant

to

accept blacks

neighborhoods

Black attitudes, as indicated

in

the national survey by the National

Research Council, express a desire for both an

in, ci

case

m

the c.uaj.uy

o±
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housing in black areas, and an increase
3)

in integrated

housing.

Given our analyses and stated assumptions, politicians and public

officials accurately

constituents

perceive and represent the attitudes

of their

respective

20

So that the issue of integrated housing, given the existence

of definite,

conflicting attitudes by individuals, and the correct perception of those
attitudes

by politicians,

is

potentially, "politically salient;

"

i.e., the

possibility exists that candidate (electoral) preference in a given election

might be based upon such an issue.

occupancy has

NOTE:

In

In this sense, the issue of

political implications

Chapter Five, reference

open

.

is

made

to the criteria essential in

order

for an "issue" to be capable of possibly determining electoral preference.

Our purpose here, again,
open occupancy and
nature

is to

establish the conflict in attitudes vis-a-vis

to infer the potential of the issue's politically salient

CHAPTER

II

DISTRICT POLITICAL IDEOLOGY AND REGIONAL ECONOMIC SKETCH

The purpose
economic areas

of

of

Chapter

Two

Maryland, and

is to

to

acquaint the reader with the basic

provide a brief political sketch

of the

state

order

In

to facilitate

by Bogue and Beale

The

state's

in

an analysis

of the

Economic Areas

former, a technique suggested

of the

"economic areas" are comprised

United States

of:

is utilized.

1

Western Maryland, Maryland

Piedmont, Southern Maryland, Maryland Eastern Shore Upper, Maryland
Eastern Shore Lower, the Baltimore Standard Metropolitan Area, and the

Maryland section

NOTE:

of the

Washington, D.C. Standard Metropolitan Area.

The Bogue and Beale technique

is

used

in

Chapters Three and Four

with respect to the analysis of candidate preference.

Western Maryland, consisting

of

Allegany and Garrett counties ranks

sixth in area population (104,539) of the state's seven regions, with
its

much

of

inhabitants concentrated around the third largest city, Cumberland (pop.

33,415).

Manufacturing (synthetic fibres

equipment)

,

,

paper products

farming (mostly dairying and beef

are leading economic activities.

Because

23

cattle)

,

,

steel, railroad

and coal mining

of its particular industrial

24

products, the strong competition in coal mining with nearby Pennsylvania

and West Virginia, and the region's greater-than-usual involvement

in rail

transportation (handling freight destined for the Baltimore Metropolitan

Area

in particular)

,

this area has

been typically one

ience layoffs during business recessions

of the first to

Western Maryland

.

exper-

63% blue

is

collar, 73% rural, less than 1% black, 3% foreign stock, with a median income
of $7000

and a median educational level

Maryland Piedmont, consisting

of 10.4

of Carroll,

Howard, and Washington counties ranks third
of the state's

around the

economic regions, with much

cities of

is

of

commute

employment than

is

Significant

to jobs in

concentrated

Southern and Eastern Shore Maryland, Maryland

more Northern than Southern

rural districts.

area population (323,808)

of its inhabitants

in its

tion, although the population is largely rural.

source

in

Frederick, Harford,

Hagerstown (pop. 36,660) and Frederick (pop. 21,744).

In contrast with

Piedmont

years.

agriculture with

numbers

economic and cultural orientaManufacturing

many

.

of inhabitants in

Maryland Piedmont
of the

of

work.

Baltimore

Federal employment, especially in

military installations such as the Aberdeen Proving Grounds,

and expanding source

larger

industries located in

Hagerstown, Frederick, or nearby parts

and Washington Metropolitan areas

is a

Railroad employment

is

is

an important

an important but

diminishing source of employment, while economic emphasis

is

cn daiiying
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directed toward nearby urban markets.

The region

by some commercial

northward extension

fruit

growing

in the

is

also characterized
of the

Shenandoah Valley.
Maryland Piedmont

is

55% blue collar, 66% rural, 5% black, 6% foreign

stock, with a median income of $10,554 and a median educational
level of
11

years

Southern Maryland, consisting
counties,

oped

is

of Calvert,

Charles, and St. Mary's

economically and culturally Southern.

in this region

Slavery was fully devel-

and only within recent decades has the white population

exceeded the black. For 300 years the culture and economy
have been based on tobacco.
tion in the country

"Southern Maryland

where the main support

of the

is

region

of the

probably the only sec-

economy

in colonial times

O

is still

the main support today."
Until 1960, this region

was

totally rural.

The single urban

setting

had slightly over 7000 persons. The region's population has increased
over the past decade (35% increase in population)
rural residential district for some

who work

areas in Baltimore and Washington.

,

since

is

has become a

in the adjacent metropolitan

The area, however, ranks

ulation (87,313) of the state's seven economic regions.

Maryland

it

last in

pop-

In addition, Southern

88% rural, 52% blue collar, 29% black, 5% foreign stock, with a

median income

of $9123

and a median educational level

of 11

years.
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Maryland Eastern Shore Upper, consisting

Queen Annes, and Talbot counties,

is

also culturally Southern, having been

a slave-holding region before the Civil War.

population (121,498)

and

,

is

farm.
for

fifth in

last thirty years this region has shifted

cash grain into dairying because

of a

change

The dairy farm

.

The region ranks

agriculturally oriented toward staple crops

such as wheat and corn. In the

the two types of farming

of Caroline, Cecil, Kent,

is

from

in the relative profitability of

now

the most numerous type of

However, grain farming remains a supplementary source

of

income

dairymen

Tenancy

rates are

Upper Eastern Shore
renting farms

farmers.
with

its

is

much higher among commercial farmers

relative to other areas in the state.

particularly

common among

NOTE: Poultry farming,

The practice

activities in the

who owns

typical of Maryland

his land in the state.

Upper Eastern Shore include

Lower Eastern Shore,

lies

is

usually the

Other economic

a substantial stake in Chesa-

peake Eay fisheries and limited manufacturing concentrated
easternmost extension that

of

dairy, grain, and general

smaller average investment in land and equipment,

enterprise of a farmer

in the

in the north-

along the Baltimore-Wilmington transporta-

tion axis

The area

is

the median income

66% blue collar, 21% black, 75% rural, 3% foreign stock:
is

$8078 and the median educational level, 10 years.

The
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region has no places of 10, 000 inhabitants or more.

NOTE:

Bogue and Beale

set a figure of 10,000 as indicative of significant concentration or

urban

O

population

Maryland Eastern Shore Lower, consisting

of

Dorchester, Somerset,

Wicomico, and Worcester counties (ranking fourth in population: 122,072)
is

also culturally Southern.

Not only was this region slave-holding

time, but recently (in the mid-sixties)

County, was the scene

of violence

,

the city of

between

Cambridge

in

civil rights activists

at

,

one

Dorchester

and staunch

segregationists

Economically, this region

is fairly

urbanized.

Both the

cities of

Cambridge and Salisbury (pop. 12,239 and 16,302 respectively)
ponsible for the processing of food products.

,

are res-

major source

In fact, the

of

industrial employment are the canneries and packing houses that process

vegetables, seafood, and poultry.

Sandy

soils are

abundant

in the region

so that an extensive truck and poultry agriculture has developed (as

opposed

to the

dairy farming of the Upper Eastern Shore)

Chesapeake Bay, very rich

.

In addition, the

in seafood, has provided for a most profitable

commercial business

The standard

of living of

farm operators

in this region is fair.

The

types of farming practiced, however, require large numbers of farm
laborers, both local and migratory, and among these people income levels
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are low.

Although fishing

important in the economy,

is

provide good reliable income.

have not been sufficient

The region

is

to

it

does not generally

In addition, the industrial jobs available

absorb fully the natural population increase.

67% blue collar, 31% black, 75% rural, 3% foreign stock; the

median income

is

$7441 and the median educational level

The Baltimore Standard Metropolitan Area ranks

is

9.6 years.

first in

population of

the state's seven regions (1,638,086) and contains eight places inhabited

by

twenty thousand persons.

at least

Note that the area contains Anne

Arundel and Baltimore counties, and Baltimore City.
Baltimore City
a

degree

of

is

Southern

in cultural

background but has acquired

heavy industry and foreign immigration which make

ular background extremely marginal.

The

this partic-

city's trade is mostly foreign

with import tonnage predominating while the major industries process

imported raw material.

Such processing includes copper, sugar,

area's largest employer) and
is

steel (the

gypsum. Another major port-related industry

shipbuilding and repair

The rural portions

of this region are characterized

by livestock,

dairy, and poultry farming, similar to Maryland Piedmont and the Lower

Eastern Shore.

The area,

in total, is 86%

urban, 22% black, ll%foreign

stock, 47% blue collar, with a median income level of $10,791 and a median

educational level of 11 years.
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The Washington. D.C. Standard Metropolitan Area ranks
second

in

population of the state’s various regions (698,323) and contains
ten places
of 10,000 inhabitants or

more (indicating concentration

of urbanization)

.

Note that the region consists of Montgomery and Prince Georges
counties

The area

is

the personification of suburbia, whose growth has been directly

linked with that of Washington, D.C.

,

and

its

In general, families located in the area

and upper class income brackets while
has occurred.

The region

is

many

federal employees.

have been

of the

upper middle

a 97.7% rate increase in population

91% urban, 13% black, 17% foreign stock, 28%

blue collar with a median income level of $14,580 and the median educational
level, 14 years.

The second-stated purpose
sketch" of the state.

In pursuit of this

ground information compiled
"Maryland

1"

of this

in the

(the First

chapter

is to

endeavor, we

Almanac

of

provide a "political
utilize political

American

Congressional District)

,

is

Politi cs

back-

^
.

comprised

of the

Eastern Shore and much of the western shore of the Chesapeake Bay; this
district

corresponds

and "Lower," and two
St.

Mary's counties)

Shore was the scene

those counties in Maryland Eastern Shore, "Upper"

to

.

of three counties in

As indicated

in

Southern Maryland (Calvert and

our economic analysis, the Eastern

of significant resistance to civil rights activity in the

mid-sixties, the district having voted 22% for the Wallace candidacy in 1968

30

(compared

to a statewide

counties in Maryland

economic analysis

The

of

1

average

of 14%)

.

However, the western shore

are more conventionally conservative.

NOTE:

See

Southern Maryland

First District, in the sixties,

was represented by conservative

Republican Rogers C.B. Morton, though the area traditionally elects conservative Democrats into office.

NOTE:

of the state's congressional districts,
office

Throughout our

political analysis

congressmen referred

to

during the 1966 gubernatorial election year. Indicative

district's orientation

toward

civil rights policy

were those
of

in

the

was Morton's vote against

the Civil Rights Act of 1966 (providing for guarantees of nondiscriminatory
selection of federal and state jurors, and authorization for the Attorney

General

accommodations)
Rights Act
ally

desegregation suits with regard

to initiate

(a

The Congressman

.

to

public schools and

also voted against Title IV of the Civil

provision voted upon separately by the House)

provided for nondiscriminatory practices

in the selling

,

which gener-

and renting

of

housing
Redistricting altered the district to the Democrats' advantage recently.,

adding more marginal, rural and suburban territory. The over-all
of this

change was
"Maryland

to

2"

affect

increase conservative dominance in the area.
(the

Second Congressional

District)

comprises the

oreater oortion of suburban Baltimore County and Harford ocuruy

to the
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east (the district corresponds with the "economic areas" of Maryland
Pied-

mont

in part,

and segments of the Baltimore Standard Metropolitan Area)

Baltimore County, 97% white,

suburbs," like Towson, north

is

composed

of the city,

of

numerous "comfortable WASPy

and industrial suburbs

Dundalk

of

and Sparrows Point between Baltimore City and the Chesapeake Bay

The Second
against

Humphrey

District
in 1968,

sixties' "white backlash"

was registered

a

to also vote against

Kennedy
As

a

pronounced conservatism, voting

and demonstrating the presence

phenomenon

Point) cast significant support for

was

a

^
.

(especially in

of

the late

Dundalk and Sparrows

George Wallace. The

district, in 1970,

Democratic Senatorial Candidate, Joseph Tydings-

style liberal.

rough indication

of the district's political orientation, Democratic

Congressman Clarence Long voted against

the "Philadelphia Plan" in 1969

(which would have required the hiring of a certain percentage

on construction projects funded by the federal government)

,

of minorities

against the

welfare-refcrm-oriented "Family Assistance Plan" (which would have

provided a guaranteed annual income of 61600 for qualified families)
for the

"Work-Stamps" provision (which would require an individual

accept any offer of any job as a condition to receiving food stamps)

The Representative's
(the

,

Committee on

association with the political

Political Education)

arm

of the

and
to

.

AFL-CIO

and his general pro-labor policies,

have led some

to label

Mr. Long as a "domestic

NOTE:

liberal.

In a

study conducted by Barone, Ujifusa, and Matthews, the Congressman's
roll call vote

was

in

agreement with COPE

official policy

on 87%

of the

n

issues before the House.

No doubt the Congressman's labor

a direct result of his constituency in

policies

were

Dundalk and Sparrows Point, the

heavily blue-collar areas
Despite this stated district's observed conservatism, as judged by
the region's past voting record, Mr. Long supported the 1966 Civil Rights
Act, and voted for the open housing provision of Title IV.

"Maryland

3"

(the

Third Congressional District)

eastern portions of the city of Baltimore and part

between Baltimore and Annapolis

Standard Metropolitan Area, cited
3

The

.

district

in the

of

,

is

the southern and

Anne Arundel County

corresponds

to the

Baltimore

economic area analysis. Maryland

contains a mixture of blacks from central Baltimore, white blue-collar

workers from east Baltimore, and a few relatively
suburbanites from Anne Arundel County.

affluent

and conservative

Since three-quarters

of the 3rd's

residents live within the city, the district has been traditionally Democratic.

The

district voted 20% for Wallace in 1968

district

mean

of 3.4%)

.

The support

(compared

for Wallace

to a statewide, eight

was most

significant in white,

blue-coilar populated east Baltimore.

Democrat Edward Garmatz, the 3rd's Congressman, was considered a
liberal on domestic issues

due

to his

pro-labor policies and general associa-
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tion with

COPE. NOTE: Garmatz,

with official

COPE

in roll call analysis,

was

in

agreement

policy on 96% of the issues before vote in the House.

addition, selection of three

random issues upon which

In

a perceived "liberal"

or "conservative" position could be taken, indicates that the Representative

voted "liberal"

,

in favor of the aforementioned Philadelphia Plan, for

i.e.

the Family Assistance Plan, and against the

Work-Stamp provision.

Nevertheless, despite this "domestic liberalism," Garmatz voted
against the 1966 Civil Rights Act and against Title IV.

seem

to

County

be representative

Such behavior would

of constituency in east Baltimore

and Anne Arundel

in particular.

"Maryland

4"

(the

Fourth Congressional District)

,

comprises the

central and northeast portions of the city of Baltimore and a small part of

suburban Baltimore County;
Standard Metropolitan Area

this district

in

corresponds

to the

Baltimore

our economic area analysis. Within the

district are the prosperous, all-white outskirts of the city, yet a

proportion of blacks have been migrating

.

The

4th

,

growing

with many of

residents descendants of Irish, Italian, and Greek immigrants,

its

all of

whom

are determined to "protect their neat and comfortable homes from outsiders,"
is

the most middle class, most conservative, and least Democratic of the

three congressional districts within Baltimore City (other such districts are
the Third and Seventh)

.
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Democratic Congressman George Fallon, the district’s representative,

was considered

a liberal on domestic issues.

This description appears

to

be supported by the Congressman's pro-vote on the Family Assistance Plan.

However, where the 1966 Civil Rights

Bill

and Title IV

of the bill

were con-

cerned, Mr. Fallon registered a vote against the proposed legislation.

"Maryland

5"

(the Fifth

Congressional District)

Prince Georges County (corresponding

to the

,

is

comprised

of

Washington Standard Metro-

politan Area) and Charles County (corresponding to Southern Maryland)

Wealthy, white-collar oriented Prince Georges County, with many

.

of its

residents employed by the federal government-although not to the extent
of

neighboring Montgomery County-

is

Democratic by a

2 to

Yet in recent statewide elections, the county's residents,
striving and insecure,"

9

1

margin.

"still

upward

have found the conservative position on law and

Later, in 1970, Senator Joseph Tydings, the

order most attractive.

previously mentioned liberal, was to carry this county by only 54%.

Charles County, given
tion, as

Southern economic and cultural tradi-

was mentioned, has followed a rurally conservative

The county voted 26%

for the Wallace

statewide figure of 14%)
of these

to the

.

candidacy

The economic,

NOTE:

(compared

to a

cultural, and political orientations

two counties, comprising Maryland's

unusual contrast.

in 1963

political pattern.

Fifth, indeed represent an

26% support for Wallace in Charles County was the
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third largest percentage of votes received by the candidate of the state's

twenty-two counties

The
was

to

5th 's

congressman was conservative Democrat Hervey Mac’nen who

be ousted in 1968 by conservative,

lav/

and order candidate,

Republican Lawrence Hogan, an ex-FBI agent;

(Machen voted against the

Civil Rights Act of 1966 and against Title IV of the

over Machen appeared

to reflect

bill)

that "he thought he had the district safely put

Machen did

Hogan's victory

an attraction for the former's law and order

campaign while the conservative Democrat seemed

that the defeat of

.

to fall victim to the fact

away."^ Most

significant is

not demonstrate a weakening of conservative

ideology in the Fifth District since Hogan, in 1970, was to crush an out-

spoken liberal Democrat with 62%

of the vote.

In addition, indicative of the district's political ideology, analysis of

the Republican's roll call behavior indicates agreement with the liberal,
social welfare oriented "Americans for Democratic Action" on only 22% of

issues voted upon; 25% agreement with

COPE

(this

Congressman's, generally, anti-labor policies)

;

has implications for the

but 56% agreement with

the conservative, anti-social welfare oriented "Americans for Constitutional

Action."

Yet Mr. Hogan

for Family Assistance.

is

on record as voting for the Philadelphia Plan and
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So that Maryland

5 politically,

conservative (especially with regard

appears
to

mixture

to reflect a

law and order)

Prince Georges County, where close proximity

to

of

mostly

usually Democratic

,

Washington, D.C.'s

federal bureaucracy has accounted for traces of liberalism, and rural

Charles County, whose great attraction for George Wallace

is

indicative of

the county's Southern, conservative tradition.

"Maryland
handle

6"

of the state,

(the Sixth

is

,

the western pan-

extending from the Appalachian Mountains around Cum-

the suburban reaches of greater Baltimore and Washington; the

berland

to

district

corresponds

in our

Congressional District)

to

Western Maryland and portions

economic analysis. The

district,

of

Maryland Piedmont

though once accurately character-

ized as conservative and Republican, appeared in the sixties as more

Republican than conservative.

In 1966, the 6th district

liberal Republican Charles Mathias Jr.

1960.

who had served

was represented by
the region since

Brief analysis of the Republican's vote on selected issues indicates a

liberal political orientation.

In addition to supporting the Philadelphia Plan,

the Congressman voted for the Civil Rights Act of 1966 as well as Title IV

Analysis of

roll call

official policy

record demonstrates that Mr. Mathias agreed with the

taken by the liberal Americans for Democratic Action on 78%

of the issues before vote;

an 83% agreement rate with COPE; and only an 11%

agreement rate with the conservative Americans

for Constitutional Action.
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"Maryland
of

7"

(the

Seventh Congressional

District)

west Baltimore, as well as a substantial portion

County

.

The

is steadily

of

,

includes most

suburban Baltimore

7th is the heartland of the city's large Jewish population

moving out

suburbs. Blacks are now a majority

into the

city portion of the 7th, but are a minority district-wide, since the

which

in the

suburbs

are almost entirely white.

From 1952

to 1970, the district, a perennial

was represented by Samuel Friedel,
City Democratic organization

post

WW

II

11
.

Democratic stronghold,

a loyal supporter of the Baltimore

NOTE:

The

district, since the immediate

period, has consistently voted Democratic with the exception

1966 (the gubernatorial race)

when Republican Spiro Agnew

,

Democratic, anti-open housing candidate George Mahoney.

considered

to

be a liberal domestically,

is

1

of

defeated

o

Friedel,

on record as voting for the

Philadelphia Plan, for the 1966 Civil Rights Act, and for Title IV of the 1966
Act.

In 1970, the 7th district

was

to elect

black Congressman Parren Mitchell

into office, reflecting the increased percentage of blacks in the area.
in the composition of the 7th' s population

change

came massive during Friedel's
sixties

.

latter

was a trend

This

that first be-

years in office, dating back

to the

mid-
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"Maryland
middle class

to

8"

(the Eighth

Congressional District)

upper

See the economic analysis

Washington, D.C. Standard Metropolitan Area for a description

pertinent SES factors.

The eighth

As

of

also comprised of small portions of

is

more conservative Howard and Anne Arundel counties

of

is liberal,

upper class Montgomery County where many residents are

employed by the federal bureaucracy. NOTE:
of the

,

to the

north and east.

dominated by the socio-economic characteristics

befits a district

Montgomery County, both the

local

are the most liberal in the state.

Democratic and Republican parties

Since 1966, the district has been repre-

sented by Gilbert Gude, an anti-war Republican who has an agreement rate

with the Americans for Democratic Action, higher than that

Democrats

(74%)

.

The Congressman's

issues before vote in the House

Americans

is

rate of

of

many Maryland

agreement with COPE on major

83%, and only 25% with respect to the

for Constitutional Action.

The Representative, further

indicat-

ing a liberal orientation on domestic issues, voted for the Philadelphia Flan,
for the Family Assistance Plan, against the

the 1966 Civil Rights Act.

Work-Stamp provision and

for

Despite this "across-the-board" liberal record,

however. Congressman Gude voted against the open housing provision
(Title IV)

,

of the Civil Rights Act.

supported the Wallace candidacy

One

final note is that the 8th District

in 1968,

by only

8%, the least

amount

of
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support registered for the Alabama governor

of the state's eight

congres-

sional districts
In conclusion, our

economic and
state's

purpose here has been

political characteristics of

economic areas, i.e.

to brief the

Maryland.

By

reader on basic

investigation of the

each region's occupational foundation, racial

and ethnic composition, and other pertinent data, we have an admittedly
"rough indication"

of electoral

behavior given a particular issue.

The

generalized nature of our conclusion based upon economic area analysis

is

emphasized
In investigation of

Maryland's congressional districts, we are

presented with the opportunity
election based

upon knowledge

In addition, although the

to

make an educated guess about

of district political ideology

a particular

and background

terms by which congressmen have been labelled,

i.e. "liberal," "conservative," are admittedly

ambiguous

(as

are the

implications of a vote on the Philadelphia Plan, Family Assistance Plan, or

Work-Stamp provision)

,

such techniques do allow the reader

acquainted with the general ideological orientations
state.

The generalized nature

of political

background

is also

of

of

to

become

each district

in the

our conclusion, based upon a description

emphasized.
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Most significant, departing from the pattern

of

generalized conclu-

sions, knowledge of each representative's vote on the Civil Rights Act of
1966, specifically the Title IV open occupancy provision, permits a relatively

accurate ability to "predict" electoral behavior, given the 1966 gubernatorial
election.
i.e.

if

If

the thesis of Miller and Stokes cited in Chapter

congressmen do represent constituency

issues, then roll call vote on

serve as an accurate indicator

where open occupancy

is

One

is

accepted,

attitudes on civil rights

Title IV of the 1966 Civil Rights Act should
of district electoral

the key issue.

behavior given an election

Before examination

"con-

of this

clusion-based hypothesis," one major, technical problem must

first

be

addressed
Since our concern deals with permitting both educated assumption and
accurate prediction vis-a-vis a gubernatorial election (especially from
analysis of the Title IV provision)

,

to facilitate the

purpose

of this

chapter,

the aforementioned "congressional district" must be transposed into the

county-oriented discussion of Maryland's "economic areas."
in

mind the

political

backgrounds

of the

So that keeping

respective districts, the transposi-

tion appears as thus:

FIRST CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICT
Economic Areas: "Upper" and "Lower Eastern Shore; two of three counties
in Southern MaTyland; southern Baltimore Standard Metropolitan Area
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Counties
Cecil, Kent, Queen Annes, Caroline, Dorchester, Wicomico,
Worcester, Somerset, St. Gary's, Calvert, east and southern Anne Arundel
:

SECOND CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICT
Economic Are as: Baltimore Standard Metropolitan Area; smaller portion
Maryland Piedmont
Counties

of

Baltimore County, Harford County

:

THIRD CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICT
Economic Areas
Counties
City

:

Baltimore Standard Metropolitan Area

northern Anne Arundel County, southern and eastern Baltimore

:

FOURTH CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICT
Economic Areas

:

Baltimore Standard Metropolitan Area

central and northern Baltimore City; small portion
Counties
eastern Baltimore County
:

of

south-

FIFTH CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICT
Economic Areas: southern portion of Washington, D. C. Standard Metropolitan Area and the western-most portion of Southern Maryland
Counties:

Prince Georges and Charles counties

SIXTH CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICT
Econo mic Area s: Western Maryland and Piedmont Maryland (except
Harford County and southern Howard County)

for

Garrett, Allegany, Washington, Frederick, Carroll counties,
Counties
northern Howard County
:
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SEVENTH CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICT
Economic Areas
Counties

:

Baltimore Standard Metropolitan Area

:

northern Baltimore City; small portion

of

southwest Baltimore

County

EIGHTH CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICT
Economic Areas

northern portion of the Washington, D.C. Standard Metropolitan Area; small portion of Maryland Piedmont; small portion of Baltimore
:

Standard Metropolitan Area

Montgomery County, southern Howard County, western Anne
Arundel County

Counties

:

Given

this transposition,

First, Third,

we

earlier stated that

and Fourth Districts voted against the

1966 Civil Rights Act.

A preview

of electoral

congressmen from the

Title IV provision of the

behavior

in the 1966

guber-

natorial race demonstrates that the Baltimore Standard Metropolitan Area

(corresponding

to districts

Three and Four)

,

cast majority support for the

Democratic, anti-open occupancy candidate George Mahoney.

In addition,

both "Upper" and "Lower" Eastern Shore Maryland (corresponding
First District)

,

voted for the Democrat, Mahoney.

Maryland and Maryland Piedmont (corresponding

which Representative Mathias cast support
can Agnew

pancy.

in the

to the

Simultaneously, Western
Sixth District in

to the

for Title IV)

,

voted for Republi-

gubernatorial race, the perceived liberal on open occu-

So that knowledge

of district orientation

toward the Title IV pro-

vision of the 1966 Civil Rights Act enables us to easily predict electoraj.
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behavior in corresponding economic areas relative

to the 1966

governor's

race, given the issue of open occupancy.
Ability to predict electoral behavior given knowledge of roll call

vote on Title IV in the Second, Fifth, Seventh, and Eighth Districts

somewhat more limited. Congressmen
tricts

in both the

is

Second and Seventh Dis-

voted for the Title IV provision despite the fact that a preview

of 1566

election results indicates that the districts' corresponding economic area,

the Baltimore Standard Metropolitan Area, voted for anti-open housing

candidate Mahoney.

In all probability,

it is

the affect of the Maryland

Piedmont constituency (which comprises a portion
that accounted for

Congressman Long's vote

the Seventh District

is

of the

Second

District)

Where

in favor of Title IV.

concerned, even though located

in

,

an economic

area supportive of the anti-open housing candidate, the large population

of

blacks and Jews probably accounted for Congressman Friedel's affirmative
vote on open occupancy.

Concerning the

Fifth District (corresponding to the Washington,

Metropolitan economic area and a portion of Southern Maryland)
against Title IV of the 1966

bill

appears

to

be a direct influence

,

of

D.C.

the vote

the mix-

ture between rurally conservative Southern Maryland and a less than
"totally liberal" Prince

Georges County. NOTE:

We previously mentioned

that Prince Georges County, one of two counties in the liberal Washington,
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D. C. suburban area,

is

not liberal on domestic issues to the degree of

neighbor, Montgomery County.

This was indicated in analysis

and Eighth Congressional Districts

The Eighth Congressional
D.C Metropolitan Area;

its

of the Fifth

.

District (corresponding to the Washington,

specifically

Montgomery County and portions

Howard County and Anne Arundel County)

,

of

illustrates our inability to

predict the electoral behavior of the state's economic areas from knowledge
of district vote

on Title IV, with

total

Given the dominant

accuracy.

existence of Montgomery County, with respect to the Eighth Congressional
District (as

opposed

to the Fifth District

where there appeared no dominance

but an ideological mixture between Prince Georges County and Southern
oriented Charles County)

man Gude on

Title IV.

electoral behavior

,

we would expect an

Such an expectation

is

affirmative vote by Congress-

enhanced by subsequent

which saw the county heavily

reject the anti-open housing

candidate, George Mahoney in the 1966 governor's election.
If

our analysis appears somewhat complex, we can sum up the purpose

and conclusion

of this

chapter in the following manner:

generally, to acquaint the reader with Maryland's economic areas, thus
permitting "educated assumptions" relative to electoral behavior given an
1)

issue

(s)

generally, to familiarize the reader with the state's polical background,
thus enabling an "educated assumption" about electoral behavior given an
issue (s)
2)
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3)

specifically, to enable one to predict with accuracy, electoral behavior

where open occupancy was the key issue,
vote on the open occupancy provision to the

in the 1966 gubernatorial election,

given knowledge of district
Civil Rights Act of 1966 (Title IV)

Such

a prediction

were concerned

.

was possible where four

We attempted

to

give an explanation as to

behavior could not be accurately predicted

economic area)

,

simply from knowledge

where such predictions were found not
of predicting electoral

knowledge

of

of the state's eight districts

in the

why

governor's race (by

of the district's vote

to

electoral

be possible.

on Title T V

NOTE: The technique

behavior in the 1966 gubernatorial election from

congressional vote on Title IV of the 1966 Civil Rights

Bill is

chronologically valid since the open housing provision was voted upon by
the House in August, three months before the election.
*

CHAPTER

III

THE DEMOCRATIC PRIMARY
The hope

of

Governor Millard Tawes

that the Democratic party could

unite under the middle-of-the road banner of Attorney General

Finan appeared

to

be challenged early by the expression

of

U.S. Senator

Joseph Tydings who openly doubted that the party "can avoid
fight in the primary."

*

Thomas

a factional

Finan, with support of the state's established

political organizations, ran

on his record as attorney general.

Carlton

Sickles, congressman-at-large and supported by Tydings, assumed the

reformer's role to put integrity back into state government.
"for nearly

two decades a

George Mahoney,

political spectacular but unsuccessful candidate,

again dismissed by the political unwary," based his campaign against enO

forced open occupancy.

Clarence Miles, attorney and banker, proposed

changes within the tax system and advocated a general policy

government

of

thrift.

The 1966 Maryland Democratic Primary can be analyzed
major issues addressed by the candidates and their selection
strategy.

in

of

terms

of six

campaign

Positions on the issues of tax reform, increased state aid to educa-

tion, selected salary increases,

crime prevention, and prevention
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of

waste

47

in

government appear

Baltimore Sun

,

as both

ambiguous and strikingly similar. The

appaiently recognizing these latter characteristics, stated

an editorial that the Maryland Democrat should beware
poisoning

3

The single issue upon which

were taken was

that of

open occupancy.

Voters questionnaire, submitted

to

than any other issue.

of "political hot air

definite stands

by the candidates
League

In fact, a statewide

candidates running for office

level, indicated that attitudes on integrated housing

Specifically,

it

in

at

of

Women

every

were more polarized

was the candidacy

of

George Mahoney,

millionaire paving contractor, that assisted in making open housing a salient

issue

THE MAHONEY CANDIDACY
The platform George Mahoney adopted

in the

primary consisted

single plank, that of an unequivocal opposition to open occupancy.

candidate maintained that,

cy legislation;

if

elected, he

to potential

it

became

a favorite tactic of

supporters that

lawyers will beat on you, you'll be

"if

it.

In fact,

Mr. Mahoney

to

an open housing law passes, federal

in real

bad trouble.

candidate advised Maryland Democrats that the right

home should not be interfered with by

The

would work against open occupan-

such legislation was passed, he would veto

throughout the campaign

suggest

if

of a

Additionally, the

to sell

or rent one's

the federal government.

This,
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claimed Mahoney, was the only issue in the campaign.
to this latter assertion

Probably

in

response

by Mr. Mahoney, the Baltimore Sun commented

in the

following manner:

"Mr. Mahoney's case is a special one, not only requiring close
consideration but crying for it. The nature of his campaign with
its bald appeal to the greatest backward prejudices of voters
illustrates. .this candidate's utter incapacity for elective
office. A principal responsibility of the Democratic party in
this primary is to make sure that Mr. Mahoney does not by any
.

chance become Governor

of

Maryland. "5

Analysis of the candidate's positions on other issues lends validity

to

the assertion of ambiguity and ultimate similarity existent in the campaign.

Mr. Mahoney stressed the need

for increased crime control noting "the

age of savagery." The candidate pointed
state

to the restrictions

new

placed upon

law enforcement agencies by the federal government, the leniency on

criminals by the courts, and various organizations such as the Civilian

Review Board as a cause
Mr. Mahoney appeared

to

for the increased crime rate in the state.

have

at least

one interpretation for the increased

crime rate, but presented no viable solutions
the Sun to again

comment

that "Mr.

to

the problem, thus prompting

Mahoney has

issues in a specific and forthright manner.

failed to discuss the real

Where the issue

of

taxes w as
r

e.g.

concerned, the candidate proposed the elimination

of duplication,

dispensing with the Baltimore City Departments

Health and Public Works,

of

and placing such services with the responsibility

of the state.

No reference
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was made

to the

tax proposal

Cooper-Hughes Tax Amendment,

which levied from

3 to 6

a controversial graduated

percent tax on incomes, though the

candidate indicated opposition to the present, unpopular property ana

earnings taxes.

Finally, Mr.

Mahoney

took, what can be labelled as the

"expected position" on education (similar

would take)

,

by stating the necessity

to the stance other

for increased state aid to education,

and increased salaries for teachers and law enforcement
ific

candidates

officials.

Mo spec-

monetary figures were offered.
Clearly, the political strategy of the Mahoney candidacy was based

upon

his

open occupancy position. The Sun had suggested

was counting on the issue

of

open housing

to get elected.

that

Mr

.

Mahoney

Specifically, the

strategy of this Democratic hopeful dictated taking the perceived popular

stand on a major, single, controversial issue and remain vague on other

To other candidates

issues.

in the

primary race, Mr. Mahoney became the

"single-issue candidate," whose campaign in the words of rival Clarence
Miles, was based upon "racial hatred."

bers

of

However, where significant num-

Maryland Democrats were concerned, Mr. Mahoney was simply the

"anti-open occupancy candidate," whatever

its

implications.

Such

a voter

perception was the key to the Mahoney success in the primary.
It

was

was aforementioned

to capitalize

that the strategy of the

on the open occupancy issue

.

Mahoney candidacy

Indeed

,

open housing was

to
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become the

salient issue in the

primary as

later anlaysis indicates.

Logically,

the platform adopted by a candidate, and his perception of the popular and/or

"correct" stand on the key issue

Our point

is that

(s)

Mahoney's victory

can determine electoral victory or defeat.

,

in the

primary

is indicative of the

candidate's accurate evaluation of the affect of open occupancy as an issue

and the correct or popular position maintained. Subsequent analysis

of

other

candidates' strategies will indicate platforms based on considerations other

than that of open housing; strategies that proved a failure.

Mahoney

In essence,

diluted the potency of all other issues in the campaign upon which

opposition candidates based their strategies
Electoral analysis appears to support the salient nature of the open

occupancy question
Maryland, 30%

.

Mahoney was

of the vote in

compile 55%

to

of the vote in

Southern

Upper Eastern Shore Maryland, and 38%

Baltimore Standard Metropolitan Area.

in the

Previous politico-economic descrip-

tion of these regions suggested a rural, Southern-oriented cultural

tradition in these two former areas, and a general ethnic conservatism within

the latter region;

(see

Chapter Two)

conducted by Dr. Robert Leevy
significant support for

Mahoney

Political Scientist suggests that

of

.

A quantitative analysis

of the

primary,

Maryland's Goucher College indicated

as a result of the "white backlash."

Mr. Mahoney won the primary due

favorable reaction for his candidacy in the white precincts

of

The

to the

Baltimore
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City and County

,

where voters had an average

of

seven

to eight

years

education and were classified as low to moderate income groups.

of

In addition,

given a four candidate race, Mr. Mahoney received an amazing 46%

of the

white working class vote in Baltimore City and 69% of the Slavic vote. 7

Our own quantitative analysis, very generally, appears
the findings of Dr. Leevy.

Pearson's Correlation

statistical

to

support

technique

indicates that 27% of the variance in Mahoney's vote can be explained by the

percent vote for Wallace in a given region.

Here we imply a positive

Note:

association between preference for the segregationist policies of George

Wallace in 1964 and attraction for Mahoney's anti-open housing stance.
addition, 15% of the variance in the

Mahoney vote

is

In

explained by percent

black in an area (where the greater the black population in a majority white
region, the greater the white attraction for George Mahoney)

variance in the candidate's vote

is

;

8% of the

explained by percent urban (where the

greater the urban concentration, the less likely the Mahoney vote); this

appears likely due

to the influence of

for the candidate, i.e.

those areas that voted most heavily

rural Southern Maryland (55%) and rural Upper

Eastern Shore Maryland (30%)

.

The Mahoney vote

is

also characterized

areas of lower foreign stock concentration (which explains 6%

of the

by

variance

in the candidate's vote, a negative relationship indicating the greater the

foreign stock concentration, the less likely a vote for Mahoney); lower
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median income (which explains 6%

of the

variance in the Mahoney vote, a

negative relationship indicating the lower the median income the greater
the vote for the candidate)

percent rural concentration (which explains

;

6% of the variance in the Mahoney vote, where a positive association
apparent)

lower median educational level and lower concentration

;

collar occupations (which each explain 4% respectively

the vote for this candidate)

of the

is

of

white

variance in

Finally, the percent blue collar concentration

.

in a given area explains 2% of the variance in

relationship indicating a tendency for

Mr. Mahoney's vote, a positive

Mahoney support among blue

collar

workers
Multiple Regression analysis allows us to explain 35% of the Mahoney
vote.

g

As noted, 27%

of the

variance

is

explained by the percent vote

for Wallace in 1964 (a positive association existing between the two

variables)

.

Knowledge

of

percent rural concentration, in addition

to the

Wallace vote variable allows an increase in explanatory authority to 29%
(percent rural concentration

is

The variable, percent black,

equal to an R Square Change

in addition to

knowledge

of

of .01677)

.

percent Wallace

vote and percent rural concentration, allov/s an explanatory capacity of

30% (percent black being equal to an R Square Change

of .01284)

.

Percent

white collar, given knowledge of the aforementioned variables, permits an

explanatory capacity of 32%

(this latter

variable equal

to

an R Square Change
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value of .02451)

.

Median income

level, given the

above SES-demographic

information, permits an explanatory authority of 34% (the variable, median

income, accounting for an R Square Change

of .01915)

.

Other variables

with respect to the Mahoney vote, account for less than one percent increase
in explanatory capacity although

R Square Change

median educational

level, representing an

of .00816, enables us to explain the vote for

Mahoney,

given other knowledge, by approximately 35%. Given the selected variaoies
of

percent vote for Wallace, percent rural concentration, percent black,

percent white collar, median income, median educational level, percent
foreign stock, percent urban concentration, percent blue collar, the former
five variables
in

appear most significant, as judged by R Square Change value,

determining explanatory authority with respect

to the

Mahoney

vote.

Characteristics Indicative of Support for Mahoney

high concentration of blacks
lower median income levels
c) lower median educational level
d) higher concentration of blue collar occupations
lower concentration of foreign stock
e)
lower urban concentration
f)
g) high rural concentration
h) lower concentration of white collar occupations
high percent Wallace vote in the 1964 primary
i)

a)

b)

Note:

SES-demographic descriptions are
Significant indicators of the

Change value are as

follows:

(in

relative to the state

Mahoney

vote, as judged

rank order)

mean.

by R Square
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percent vote for Wallace
percent rural, concentration
c) percent black population
d) percent white collar
e)
median income level

a)

b)

sum, given the

In

first place

showing

of

Mr. Mahoney

in

Southern,

rurally conservative Upper Eastern Shore and Southern Maryland and the
traditionally conservative and "white backlash" areas within the Baltimore

Standard Metropolitan region, open occupancy as a

appears

to

have been the key issue

This assertion

is

in

determining electoral preference.

supported by both the quantitative study conducted by

Dr. Robert Leevy and our own analysis as well
the

Mahoney vote

civil rights question

to

.

The

latter effort indicated

be distinguished, in addition to other factors, by areas

of high black population concentration (thus, theoretically, permitting

occupancy

to

appear as a relevant issue

demonstrated "significant" support

to voters)

(i.e.

,

open

and by areas which

greater support than the state

mean) for the Wallace candidacy-.

The

political strategy of

successful, though he

George Mahoney,

won with only 33%

in the

of the vote.

primary, appeared

(Indeed the four

candidate race probably permitted his victory; this question we will later

address)

.

For the present, the candidate was able

on a controversial issue, i.e.

to take a definite stand

open occupancy, choose the perceived

popular stand, and win the primary based upon his position on the issue.
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Thus one might argue

that "political expediency"

was

a

key

to the

Mahoney

success in the primary.

THE SICKLES CANDIDACY
Mahoney's chief opposition

in the Democratic

primary came from

44 yr. old Congressman-at-Large Carlton Sickles, the only candidate

unconditionally supporting open occupancy.

It

was Sickles whom the

Baltimore Sun described as "the darling of the liberals,"^ and the Salis-

bury Times

,

an Eastern Shore Newspaper, referred

The Congressman ran on

of labor.

to as "the

a platform of "quality

spokesman

government,"

pointing to the corrupt, inefficient Tawes Administration and the political

bossism

of

Democratic financial contributor George Hocker, a millionaire

brewery king. Sickles had frequently
government was the chief issue

in the

stated that the necessity for quality

campaign.

On other

issues, the

candidate proposed an end to the unpopular income and earnings tax

Mahoney)

,

and an increase

in corporate taxes with a simultaneous

out of taxes on business personal property.

(as did

phasing

Sickles, in addition, proposed

a tax reform plan which he stated would be based upon a revision of the

Cooper-Hughes proposal, rejected by the

State Legislature in 1965.

In

retrospect, the tax reform proposals of Mr. Sickles appear somewhat more

comprehensive than that
cant difference

is

of

Mr. Mahoney, yet

not apparent

.

in the final analysis, signifi-

Both candidates were opposed

to

the
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unpopular earnings and local income taxes; one candidate favored tax
reform based upon a revision of the Cooper-Hughes plan, the other candidate did not address the issue.

Mr. Sickles adopted the expected position on the question
aid to education and increased salaries for selected occupations.

gressman proposed additional funds
had proposed)

,

to

be provided by the state

of state

The Con(as

Mahoney

although Sickles, unlike Mahoney, emphasized the necessity

of school construction in Baltimore City in particular.

Note that the

candidate suggested a $1500 grant for each child in the public school system,

an increase

of $1430

from the present $70 grant per child by the

state!

Such a proposal prompted Sickles' opponents, especially Mr. Miles,
the

Congressman as

a "candidate in sneakers," i.e.

them-anything" platform.^

In

to label

running on a "promise-

addressing the question

increased salaries

of

for law enforcement officials, Mr. Sickles cited a proposal calling for a

minimum

of $5600 to $6000 for Baltimore City police, a plan

specific than that suggested

by Mr. Mahoney.

In

somewhat more

sum, however, where

issues other than that of open occupancy are concerned, there appears
difference on positions taken by Sickles and Mahoney.

If

little

"differences" did

exist, voters considered such variances to be minor; alternatively, signifi-

cant differences
issues.

may have been perceived on what

voters considered minor

For example, Congressman Sickles emphasized a particular need

57

for state aid to education for Baltimore City yet the
candidate placed second
to

Mr. Mahoney who frequently spoke

and public

officials as a

of the

incompetencies of city politicians

reason for Baltimore's financial problems; Mahoney

received 34% of the vote in Baltimore City, Sickles, 32%.

preference for a tax reform plan, Sickles, as

it

In indicating a

was noted, suggested

a

revision of the Cooper-Hughes proposal which in 1965, had been defeated
in the State Legislature
(the plan called for a

levy)

.

due

to its

unpopularity with the wealthier counties

graduated tax system ranging from a

3 to 6

percent

Yet the Congressman won the two most rich counties in the state,

faired well in a third

,

but not so in the more marginal areas where such a

tax structure might expect to meet with support.

Note:

In fact, a signifi-

cant portion of the Cooper-Hughes tax plan was devised by State Senator

Harry Hughes from marginal Caroline County.
In

12

low-income Southern Maryland, where unemployment

the state, and housing most inadequate, the

Congressman had

is

highest in

cited the

necessity for increased employment opportunities and additional low cost

housing while Mr. Mahoney stressed the issue

of integrated

housing.

Despite this, Mr. Sickles received 13% of the primary vote compared

to

Mr. Mahoney's 55%.
Given the above examples, we maintain

that the issue of

open occu-

pancy polarized the Mahoney and Sickles candidacies— no other issue. The
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voter acceptance or rejection of the Sickles candidacy was based
upon an
issue other than that which was the key plank and therefore the major
strategy of his campaign.
of the

it is

suggested, lessened the possibilities

Congressman's potential victory. On the other hand, and

benefit, the
of his

This,

Mahoney candidacy was based upon an acceptance

to his

or rejection

open occupancy stand--an issue and a position which he voluntarily

associated himself with.

Sickles, possibly to his disadvantage, became

labelled as the candidate "unconditionally in favor of open housing," a

question he stated was secondary to the necessity
is

government.

of quality

no coincidence that the two candidates most polarized on the issue

housing placed

first

(Mahoney with 33%

and second

of the vote, Sickles 32%)

We previously referred
labor.

in a four candidate

to

primary

It

open

of

election;

.

Mr. Sickles and his attachment

to

organized

Brief mention of the sources of the candidate's financial support

indicate funding from the Citizenship

Fund

of the

United Auto Workers, the

Labor Fund-Raising Committee for Carlton Sickles, the Education Fund-Raising of the United Steel Workers, and the Maryland State Committee on
Political Education, the political

arm

of the

AFL-CIO. Yet Sickles was

ultimately suffer from his association with organized labor.
editorial suggested that Sickles

was

to

A B altimore Sun

"too Washington-oriented to have

acquired any profound and detailed knowledge

of the state

and his debt

to
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labor

may

may be

too great at a time

when

the pressures of labor's

well be working against the general interest." 13

demnation

of the Sickles

meaningless

candidacy due

to its ties

Yet he did not.

Perhaps such con-

with labor would have been

Mr. Sickles had received the support

if

demands

of labor's

rank and

file.

In fact, the candidate received only 14% of the vote in the

white, working class precincts in Baltimore City and County compared to

46% for Mahoney. 14

was these areas

It

that in a quantitative analysis of the

primary, Dr. Robert Leevy classified as regions
is

further suggested, given our

of

"white backlash."

own analyses and observations,

Mr. Sickles position on open occupancy cost him the support

working class despite the support
dependent upon labor

for support,

of

to the

that

of the

white

organized labor, and as a candidate

such a position cost him the election.

Very simply, organized labor could not deliver
due

It

the vote to the

Congressman

saliencv of the open housing question.

In retrospect, the blueprint of the liberal's

fairly clear.

campaign strategy was

In adopting as the central issue the necessity for qualtiy

government and attacking the inefficiency and corruption

of the

incumbent

Tawes Administration the Congressman considered incumbent Attorney
,

General Thomas Finan as chief Democratic rival, net Mr. Mahoney. Understandably enough, what before the primary campaign had been referred
as the inefficient and corrupt "Tawes -Hocker Regime," by Mr. Sickles,

to
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during the campaign was labelled as the "Tawes-Hccker-Finan Regime." 15
It

can be argued that the Congressman's campaign strategy was similar

to the

"throw the rascals out" platform proved

Tydings

of

Maryland

.

was both misdirected

(in that

In

sum, the

open

Mr. Sickles

political strategy

he dismissed the potential attraction

Mahoney candidacy given open occupancy)

the candidate

of

a strategy from being a success, given

position on the subject of integrated housing.

for the

be successful by Senator

Yet the Sun suggests that the question

occupancy prevented such

of Sickles

to

,

and ineffective (since

was not perceived as a "pro-quality government" advocate, but

a candidate in favor of unconditional open housing)

.

Yet the candidacy of this particular Democratic hopeful tailed by only
1%.

Quantitative analysis enables an evaluation of support rendered for the

candidate.

Note that Sickles finished first in only one

areas within the state, yet he

won by

Washington, D.G. suburban area.

of

seven economic

a wide margin of 31% in the liberal

The closeness

of the election is

due

to the

candidate's strong second place finish in several of the state's more populated
areas, i.e., the Baltimore Standard Metropolitan Area and Maryland Piedmont.

A Pearson's

Correlation study indicates that 12% of the variance in the Sickles

vote is explained by percent black concentration where a "negative r" exists,
i.e.

the greater the black population in a given area, the less likely a vote

for Sickles.

Several comments are in order here.

We previously

stated
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Mr. Mahoney received votes from areas

that

where the issue

of

open occupancy

of

high black concentration, i.e.

is politically

relevant.

Given the identi-

cal logic, Sickles received votes from, especially, liberal, wealthy Mont-

gomery and Prince Georges Counties, where the population
minimal.

Here, the issue

of

of

blacks

is

open housing was not given the same degree

potential conflict, relative to other areas within the state.

however, that Mr. Sickles was
unconditional open occupancy.

still

of

We emphasize,

identified as the candidate in favor of

Though

a negative relationship exists

between the variable, percent black, and the Sickles vote, the candidate
received 70% of the black vote in regions
tion;

however,

this figure

gressman had anticipated

.

of 90 to 100

percent black popula-

was substantially lower than
Political

that support the

Con

observers had concluded before the

primary election that the black vote would be

split

between Sickles and

Mr Finan
.

Fifty-seven percent of the variance in the Sickles vote

by median income, where

a positive association exists, i.e.

is

explained

the greater

the median income in a given area, the greater the potential vote for the

Congressman; likewise, the less the median income, the
support for the candidate.
candidate's vote

is

less probable

Fifty-one percent of the variance in the

explained by median educational level, where a positive
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relationship is apparent; 48% of the variance in this particular vote

is

explained by percent blue collar, where a negative association exists

appears
file

to reflect Sickles inability to

previously noted)

;

garner the support

of labor's

(this

rank and

60% of the variance in the Congressman's vote

is

explained by percent foreign stock, a positive association evident; 49%
the variance

is

of

explained by percent urban, a positive association existing

between the two variables; 32%

of the

variance in the candidate's vote

is

explained by percent rural concentration, where a negative relationship
evident; 48% of the variance in the Sickles vote

is

explained by percent

white collar concentration, where a positive association exists; and 32%
the variance in the candidate's vote

is

is

of

explained by areas having "signifi-

cantly" (greater than the state mean) voted for the candidacy of George

Wallace, where a negative

r is

apparent.

Multiple Regression analysis enables us to explain 75% of the Sickles
vote.

As we noted, 60%

of the

variance in the candidate's vote

is

explained

by percent foreign stock.

A

significant foreign stock population, as indicative of support for

the Sickles candidacy, reflects the liberal's sole but overwhelming electoral

victory in the Washington, D.C. Standard Metropolitan Area.

compiled 49% of the vote in this region compared

Thomas Finan. Foreign stock concentration

is

to

The Candidate

18% for runner-up

the most significant variable
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in attempting to explain the Sickles vote (judged

analysis)
is

,

by Multiple Regression

in that l/-s of the population in the aforementioned

comprised

of non-natives;

(compared

to a state

mean

economic area

of 6%)

.

It is

this

region that represents the greatest variance in foreign stock population
relative to the statewide average, and likewise the most substantial population of this particular

group

in the state.

Yet a comprehensive evaluation

of the Sickles vote

must necessarily

consider other SES-demographic characteristics, particularly

of

the

Washington Standard Metropolitan region, since the candidate's support
originated primarily from that area.

Specifically, the

support for the 1964 Wallace candidacy (29% compared
average)

,

little

to

registered

44% for the state

a high median income level and high urban concentration,

all

represent significant R Square Change values (and therefore, are important
variables in accounting for the Sickles vote)
tional variables,

.

In

sum, knowledge

of

addi-

even where foreign stock appears as the major explantory

element, assists in evaluating the affect of the latter upon electoral prefer-

ence.

For example; although Multiple Regression, analysis indicated that

percent foreign stock did not possess a noteworthy R Square Change value
(less than 1%) in the determination of the

Mahoney

received 69% of Baltimore City's Slavic vote.

vote, the candidate

Further investigation would

reveal that a substantial number of the city's foreign stock

is

classified as
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blue collar

,

lower median income and lower median educational

variables typifying support for the Mahoney candidacy
to the

.

level; these

This we compare

white collar, higher median income and educational level

of the

Wash-

ington region's foreign stock population.
In

considering the differentiated electoral choice demonstrated by

the Slavic vote in Baltimore City and the foreign stock vote in the

Washington area, additional SES variables and the substantial role

of

the

"traditional liberalism" of the latter region, appear to have a primary affect

upon influencing candidate

selection.

NOTE:

See the politico-economic

discussion of the Washington region's "liberalism" in Chapter Two.
In essence, with respect to the Sickles vote, substantial

the foreign stock population

won by

,

segments

of

similar to other voters in this economic region

the Congressman-at-Large

,

have a liberal

political orientation.

The

foreign stock variable becomes significant in explaining Sickles' support

given the group's important numerical presence

Returning

to

our

initial

in this particular area.

Multiple Regression analysis of the Sickles

vote, additional knowledge of a region's vote for Wallace,

given percent

foreign stock, enables us to explain 72% of the candidate's vote (the

Wallace variable accounting for an R Square Change
ly 12%);

knowledge

of the area's

of .11675 or

median income level allows us

approximate-

to

explain

73% of the candidate's vote, given the above variables (median income level
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accounting for an R Square Change of .01590); finally, percent urban concentration, given the aforementioned variables, enables one to explain

74% of the Congressman's vote for governor.

The variables percent

rural,

percent black, and median educational level, together, account for an R

Square Change value

of

approximately

1%.

Characteristics Indicative of Support for Sickles

lower concentration of blacks
b) higher median income level
higher median educational level
c)
d) lower concentration of blue collar occupations
high concentration of foreign stock
e)
f)
high urban concentration
g) low rural concentration
h) high concentration of white collar occupations
low concentration of Wallace support
i)
a)

Significant indicators of the Sickles vote, as judged by the

Change

statistic:

(in

R Square

rank order)

percent foreign stock
percent vote for Wallace
c) median income level
d) percent urban concentration
a)

b)

In conclusion, the polarized relationship

Sickles candidacies

is

between the Mahoney and

emphasized. Quantitative analysis indicates

without exception, where characteristics indicative

of the

that,

Mahoney vote

exist (e.g., high concentration of blacks, lower median incomes, etc.)

the reciprocal

is

true of areas supportive of the Sickles candidacy

this is the case with

all

.

,

Again,

nine of our selected SES-demographic variables.
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In no other case, with respect to other candidates, does this reciprocal

relationship emerge without exception.

Furthermore, we maintain the exist-

ence

each candidate's "extreme" or

of this association to

be a result

of

polarized position on open occupancy.
Finally, the shortcomings of the Sickles campaign strategy

The candidate w as perceived

stressed.

as a candidate in favor of unconditional open

occupancy, an issue he claimed w as secondary
r

quality government.

is

In essence,

in

importance

to that of

Mr. Sickles was judged on an issue

strategically evaluated best by Mr.

Mahoney. So

position on open housing due to the

Mahoney candidacy,

that forced to take a

the liberal, labor

candidate's stand cost him substantial electoral support in this four-candidate primary

THE FINAN CANDIDACY
Incumbent Attorney General Thomas Finan campaigned on a vague
platform which cited the past accomplishments of the Tawes Administration,

and stated the necessity

of tax

reform in the state.

With regard to the re-

structuring of the tax system, Mr. Finan proposed a "modified" version
the Cooper-Hughes
the

Amendment

Tax Amendment; note Sickles desire

earlier discussed.

of

for a "revision" of

In addition, the Attorney

General stressed

per pupil.
the need for increased state aid to education, an increase of $240
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In an

unmistakably ambiguous manner, the candidate proposed increased

in the salaries of teachers

and

lav/

enforcement

officials, cited the

need

for

a strengthened conflict of interest law (a key plank of the Miles candidacy)

and offered

a plan to assault the

problem

Confronted by the candidacy

compelled

to

of

of pollution in the

Chesapeake Bay.

George Mahoney the candidate was

take a definite position on open occupancy.

time, declared a desire for open occupancy only

homes were concerned.

"The solution

to the

Mr. Finan,

available to blacks seeking better homes.

fact,

to

problem

of

housing," he had

In general,

ignore the issue,

This, in

at least initially.

vague positions on non-controversial issues such as

to take

state aid to education,

of interest laws, increased salaries for teachers

and

made

however, the

appeared as the candidate's major campaign strategy; e.g.

proposed conflict

at this

where commercially owned

said, "is adequate housing at low cost with long term federal loans

Attorney General attempted

ignore any controversial issue, i.e.

and law

open

enforcement

officials,

occupancy.

Clearly the Finan candidacy depended upon support from the

to

state Democratic organization

Administration.

which was controlled by the incumbent Tawes

An "extreme"

position on a controversial issue

ceived by the Attorney General as potentially damaging
party organization

to build

throughout the state.

,

to

was per-

the ability of the

support for his candidacy in various local areas
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Yet

it

given his

was

difficult for

moderate

Mr. Finan

to

appear as non-controversial

stand on integrated housing.

The

liberal

Americans

for Democratic Action criticized the candidate for his position and

support for Mr. Sickles, while the majority

of

even

,

announced

county Democratic central

committees throughout the Eastern Shore and Southern Maryland expressed

concern as
be,

if

to

what the Attorney General's actions on open occupancy would

elected.

In

one of the candidate's few references

by implication, open housing)
in northeast Baltimore,

made

,

to civil rights

(and

Mr. Finan, before the Polish American Club

clear his support for civil rights but stressed

his opposition to civil rights advocates

predominately black 4th district

who ignored

the law.

Later, in the

of Baltimore City, the Administration's

candidate emphasized the civil rights accomplishments under the TawesI

Finan government.

Upon
successful.

initial

7

inspection, the strategy of Mr. Finan appeared to be

Indicating the influence and authority of the party organization,

the candidate was able to capture 20 to 30 percent of the black vote in areas

whose population was 90
tion

among blacks

to 100

percent black; this despite the wide attrac-

tor the liberal Sickles.

Perhaps the most significant

indicator of the authority of the Tawes-Hocker organization was Finan's
electoral victory in

Lower Eastern Shore Maryland, by

Mahoney stronghold. Despite the Southern,

all

indicators, a

rurally conservative nature of
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this region (comparable with

Upper Eastern Shore and Southern Maryland)

,

the Attorney General with his position on open occupancy defeated Mr.
Ma-

honey, 39%

won

in

to 33%.

Additional figures indicate, however, that Mr. Mahoney

Maryland Upper Eastern Shore by compiling 30%

second place figure
of the vote

of 27%;

compared

to

in

of the vote to

Finan's

Southern Maryland, Mahoney compiled 55%

28% for Finan

The Attorney General carried West-

.

ern Maryland by a landslide with 64%

of the vote

and was victorious

in

Maryland Piedmont with 36%.
Unlike the electoral support illustrated for ihe candidacy

honey (where support was located primarily
tive

of

Mr. Ma-

in Southern, rurally conserva-

Upper Eastern Shore and Southern Maryland or

the conservative and

"white backlash" pockets of the Baltimore Standard Metropolitan Area); and
the Sickles candidacy (whose support

was centralized

D.C. Standard Metropolitan Area and among blacks
politan region)

,

Mr. Finan's support

economic grouping.
concentrated relative

That

is, the

is

in the

in the Baltimore

Metro-

not as readily identifiable by

Attorney General's support

the other candidates mentioned.

to

Washington,

is

not as

Mr. Finan compiled

a majority of votes in Western Maryland, Piedmont Maryland, but also

the

Lower Eastern Shore area. Analysis

of

economic regions demonstrating

support for the candidate indicates a significant diversity
araphic characteristics

.

We maintain

won

that the support

in

SES-demo-

rendered

for the

Finan
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candidacy from these economically differentiated areas was due
political authority of the

tion

Tawes Administration and

the state party organiza-

.

Despite this support, however, Mr. Finan was only able
in the four candidate
to

to the

primary election, receiving 27%

33% for Mahoney and 32% for Sickles)

of the

.

It

is

of the

to

place third

vote (compared

hypothesized that the saliency

open occupancy issue cost the Administration-backed candidate the

election, or at least significantly affected his candidacy in an adverse manner.

Hypothetically,

all factors

equal, i.e.

,

open housing as a non-issue, the

support of the incumbent Administration, the financial support

of the state's

major Democratic contributor, and the perceived moderation

the candidate

of

on major issues, logically should have produced electoral victory.

A

single

alternative, again disregarding the question of open occupancy, seems

possible.

Given the absence

of

support for the Administration candidate,

the "throw the rascals out" campaign of Mr. Sickles would seem to be most
attractive to

Maryland voters; (given the Tydings victory)

.

This rationale

appears logical not given a salient issue in the campaign, specifically open
housing.

We emphasize once more, however,

that the

two candidates most

polarized on open occupancy received the majority of votes, as opposed to

Mr. Finan and

his position of moderation.

Note:

The Attorney General's

moderate position on issues did meet with some favor as the Baltimore Sun

,
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citing the candidate

s

"good record" in public office, and representation

of

"the middle road" editorially endorsed Mr. Finan as the best
Democratic

choice.

In the final analysis,

however, the moderate position assumed by

Mr Finan on open occupancy, an
.

the affect of the

he wa s compelled

issue

Mahoney candidacy, was

incumbent seeking the

to

address due

to

a successful strategy for an

political benefits of the state party organization.

Given the 1966 Maryland Democratic Primary, however, and the saliency

of

integrated housing, the support of the state party organization, whatever
its

influence and authority, was not sufficient to produce electoral victory for

the candidate

Quantitative analysis indicates that 8% of the variance in the Finan vote
is

explained by percent black population (where a negative association exists

between the two variables)

6% of the variance in the candidate's vote

is

explained by median income level (where a negative relationship also

is

apparent)

;

3% of the variance in the Attorney General's vote

;

by percent blue collar concentration

(a

positive association
is

foreign stock concentration (where a negative

r is

and 19%

is

of

explained by percent white collar

Mr. Finan's vote

1964 primary

(a

is

(a

is

explained
recorded);

explained by percent

10% of the variance in this candidate's support

variance

is

evident)

;

3% of the

negative relationship exists)

explained, by percent vote for Wallace in the

negative association apparent)

.

Percent urban, percent
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rural, and median educational level explain 0% of the variance
in the Attor-

ney General's vote.
Multiple Regression analysis demonstrates that 19% of the Finan vote
is

explained by percent vote for Wallace (Pearson's Correlation also

indicated this)

.

Knowledge

of

an area's foreign stock concentration, given

the Wallace variable, enables an explanatory capacity of 41% (the foreign

stock variable equal to an

We mentioned

R Square Change value

of .222542)

.

the affect that the concentration of support in the

Washington, D.C. Standard Metropolitan Area had upon the Sickles candi-

dacy (where a substantial foreign stock population was present)

.

Investigation of Mr. Finan 's support indicates a concentration of votes
in

Western Maryland (foreign stock population only

date was victorious in the

3% compared
in the

to

3%)

,

although the candi-

Lower Eastern Shore, non-native population

6% statewide.

The Attorney General compiled 64%

former-mentioned region and 39%

in the latter.

tion statistic indicates a negative relationship

also

of the

vote

Pearson's Correla-

between the foreign stock

variable and the vote for Mr. Finan, no doubt reflecting the less than substantial non-native population of

Western Maryland

date winning here by an overwhelming margin)
state that

Mr. Finan was victorious due

to

.

in particular (the

Yet

it

would be

candi-

difficult to

an insignificant foreign stock

population (as quantitative analysis of this variable, without further
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investigation would indicate)
(this

.

The percent vote

for the Wallace candidacy

variable represents the greatest R Square Change value)

rural

,

concentration, and median educational level are essential SES -demographic

elements, that in conjunction with percent foreign stock knowledge, permit

an accurate evaluation
such as the political

of the

candidate's vote.

Non-quantitative factors,

abilities of the state political organization

and the

candidate's "native son" status in Western Maryland also account for .some
electoral support in this area.
In

resuming discussion

Finan vote

is

of Multiple

concerned, knowledge

Regression analysis, where the

of rural concentration,

given the

percent vote for Wallace and percent foreign stock, permits an explanatory
authority of 49% (an increase of 7%); knowledge of median educational level,

given the above variables, allows us

R Square Change value
approximately

4%)

.

to

of the variable,

explain 53% of the Finan vote (the

median income, equal

to .03974 or

The variables percent black, percent urban, median

income, and percent white collar, together, equal less than 1%

Change value.

In

sum, 53%

of the vote for the

Characteris tics Indicative of Support for Finan

b)
c)

d)

R Square

Attorney General can be

explained

a)

in

lower concentration of blacks
lower median income level
no conclusion based upon median educational level
higher concentration of blue collar workers
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e)
f)

g)
h)
i)

lower concentration of foreign stock
no conclusion based upon percent urban concentration
no conclusion based upon percent rural concentration
lower white collar concentration
lower concentration of the Wallace vote
Significant indicators of the Finan vote, as judged by the

Change
a)

b)
c)

d)

statistic:

R Square

rank order)

(in

percent vote for Wallace
percent foreign stock
percent rural concentration
median educational level

The moderate

position on open occupancy espoused by Mr. Finan,

possibly could have drawn limited support from those uncomfortable with
either of the "extreme" positions of Mr. Sickles or Mr. Mahoney.
the "middle road" position (as the

Sun referred

to

it)

,

Yet

if

was the campaign

strategy of the candidate, the plan failed to garner enough electoral support.

Mr. Finan, similar

to

Mr. Sickles, was unable

major plank of his campaign platform.

to identify himself with the

In other

words, Mr. Finan was not

perceived by voters as the sole candidate that offered tax reform or the
lone individual associated with a progressive administration, but as a

candidate in favor of open occupancy with limitations.
tion

may have worked

opponents

of

to

This latter descrip-

the candidate's disadvantage, as advocates and

open housing became unsure or dissatisfied with respect

to
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Finan

s position;

note reaction, aforementioned, by the Americans for Demo-

cratic Action and the various county Democratic central committees in the

Eastern Shore.

Both Sickles and Finan appear

Mahoney campaign strategy
salient issue

(Mahoney)

,

in

which the

by compelling others

to

have fallen victim

latter capitalized

on a potentially

to take a definite position, after

had taken the perceived popular stand.

to the

he

Such a strategy,

in

affect, neutralized the significance of the other candidates' platforms.

THE MILES CANDIDACY
The candidacy

of

lawyer and civic leader Clarence Miles, by

significant description and evaluation,

was

rathc-r

minimal in

all

affect;

the

candidate receiving eight percent of the vote compared to 33% for Mahoney,

32% for Sickles, and 27% for Finan)

among four "also-rans"

The key plank
line

government,

means

to

On other

to

.

Note:

Other votes were distributed

of the eight individuals in the

in the Miles platform

Democratic primary.

was the expressed need

end duplication, and thereby save

achieve this objective was

to

state funds.

to

stream-

A

chief

consolidate various state agencies.

issues, the candidate cited the need for conflict of interest laws to

be strengthened, an increase

in state aid to education,

salary for law enforcement officials.

In

and an increase

sum, the platform

closely parallel to that of .Attorney General Finan.

of

in

Mr. Miles was
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Similar to Finan, Mr. Miles was forced into taking a position on
open

occupancy

Mr

.

,

despite attempting to avoid the issue

.

Like the Attorney General

Miles declared his support for open housing only where commercially

owned homes were concerned.
occupancy

is

Stated Mr. Miles:

"Unconditional open

contrary to every American's right, regardless

occupy and dispose

of his

other laws applicable to

home

all

as he sees

fit,

of race, to

subject only to zoning and

property owners." 19

It

became essential

for

Miles to disassociate himself from the similarity with the Finan candidacy.

This he attempted

to

accomplish via a method utilized by Mr. Sickles---by

declaring the Attorney General's association with the corrupt and inefficient

Tawes-Hocker forces. Note

Tawes Administration,

that the

outside investigation, had admitted

to

after considerable

unethical dealings within the State

Roads Commission. Chief administrators were found guilty

of selling

land to

the state at inflated prices, after obtaining advanced knowledge of future

valuable properties via state reports

.

The Miles campaign strategy was
1)

three-fold, dictating the following:

address, as the major issue in the campaign, the need

government and eliminate duplication
agencies

(this

to streamline

of services via consolidation of state

was also proposed by Mr. Mahoney though, obviously,

not treated as the most significant issue in the campaign)

it

was

77

2)

compelled into an open housing opinion similar

to that of

Mr. Finan,

disassociate himself with similarities of the Finan candidacy by linking
the

Attorney General

to

negative aspects of the Tawes Administration; this,

however, being a strategy utilized by Mr. Sickles, Mr. Miles attached the

Congressman-at-Large on his close association with labor, and
tional

his uncondi-

pro-open occupancy stand.
Note that Mr. Mahoney's candidacy, though causing Miles to address

the open housing question, was simply dismissed as that which appealed to
"racial hatred."

20

Miles was to commit the identical strategic error made by

both Sickles and Finan in
to the opposition

respectively.

In

of the candidates

tion

3)

all

but ignoring the Mahoney candidacy relative

presented by the Attorney General and the Congressman

support of this evaluation, the Baltimore Sun

and editorial comment, was

to

,

via coverage

suggest that the chief opposi-

was between Finan and Sickles. Mr. Miles had likewise admitted

this.

as Mr. Finan attempted to remain non-controversial with regard to the

salient

open occupancy issue and thus benefit from the

political activities of

the state party organization, Mr. Miles followed this strategy in hopes

of

receiving the support of independent Democratic boss Jack Pollack (whose

might, traditionally, was wielded in Baltimore City's 4th and 5th districts;
note that the term "independent" appears appropriate

w here

concerned since the influencial Democratic fund-raiser had,

Pollack

is

in the past.
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been known

stray from an incumbent administration's chosen candidate
in

to

the party primary

A reason

for

Mr. Miles' poor fourth place finish

in the

primary given

the similarity with Finan on open occupancy (Miles, 8% of the vote, Finan,
27%),

appears able

to

Tawes-Hocker

be explained in a comparison
state party organization

of the political authority of the

and that

of a local political

boss whose

powers, indeed had been disintegrating over the years. As the primary
election would indicate (and the subsequent general election)

,

Mr. Pollack's

ability to deliver the vote in Baltimore's two aforementioned districts,

became dampened as the
fifth district,

4th district

became predominately black and the

Jewish and moderately wealthy. The 4th

dominated by Pollack's Trenton Democratic Club was

to

district, previously

be successfully

challenged by the black Fourth District Democratic Organization; note that
these two organizations would engage in political conflict again

when blacks refused

election

to

in the

general

support Mahoney. In the primary, however,

as an indicator of Pollack's crumbling ability to deliver the vote, not a

single candidate running for office, opposed by the Fourth District Democratic Organization, -was elected in that district, despite sanction

A
caution

.

by Pollack.

quantitative analysis of the Miles candidacy must be approached with
In six of

seven economic areas within the

last (or tied for last)

,

in a four candidate race.

state the candidate placed

He received l%of

the vote
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in the

Washington, D.C. Standard Metropolitan Area and Western
Maryland

respectively, 2% of the vote in Southern Maryland, 9% in
Maryland Piedmont,

10% in the Baltimore Standard Metropolitan Area, 13% of the vote
in the Lower

Eastern Shore and 26% in the Upper Eastern Shore where he placed
third.
Quantitative study of Miles' support reflects his status as "favorite-son"

candidate of Queen Anne's County (where he received 56%

of the vote)

Note that Mr. Miles did not carry, nor did he place second,

in

any other

county within the Upper Eastern Shore (where Queen Anne's County
located)

is

is

.

Given the above reservation, 6%
vote

.

of the

variance

in the candidate's

explained by percent black in the area, where a positive association

exists (Queen Anne's County is 25% black, greater than the state mean); 3%
of the variance in the candidate's vote is explained

stock,

where

by percent foreign

a negative relationship is apparent (the county

stock, less than the state mean)

;

median income

of $8200, less than the

16% of the variance in Mr. Miles' vote
level, a

5% foreign

6% of the variance in the Miles vote

explained by median income, a negative relationship evident
lar area has a

is

is

(this particu-

average for the

;

state);

explained by median educational

negative r evident (the County's median educational level

less than the state average)

is

12% of the variance

is

is 9.5,

explained by percent

blue collar concentration, where a positive association

is

found (Queen Anne's
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County

is

65% blue collar, greater than the state average)

variance in the vote lor Miles

where

is

;

10% of the

explained by percent urban concentration,

a negative relationship is evident (the county is entirely rural);
6%

of the variance in this vote is explained

by percent rural concentration,

positive r apparent;

is

12% of the variance

explained by percent white collar

occupations, a negative association evident (the county

below the average for the
is

state);

and 18%

a

of the

is

35% white collar,

variance in the Miles vote

explained by the percent vote for Wallace, a positive relationship existing

(Wallace received 57% of the

Queen Anne's vote

primary, greater than the state mean)

in the 1964 presidential

.

Multiple Regression analysis enables us to explain 24% of the Miles

vote given knowledge of the percent vote for Wallace and median educational
level (the latter variable accounting for an

knowledge

of

R Square Change value

of 7%)

percent foreign stock, given the aforementioned variables

permits explanation of 30% of the candidate's vote (the R Square Change

value

of the latter variable

equal

to 6%)

;

percent urban, given other pre-

viously mentioned variables enables explanation of 38% of this candidate's
vote (R Square Change, in this case, equal to 8%); knowledge

of

percent blue

collar occupations permits us to explain 41% of the Miles vote (R Square

Change equal

to 3%); finally,

percent black, given the aforementioned
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information, allows an explanatory capacity of 42% with
regard to the candidate's vote (an

R Square Change value equal

to 1%)

.

In

sum, we can

explain 42% of Mr. Miles' vote.

Characteristics Indicative of Support for Miles

high concentration of black population
lower median income
c)
lower median educational level
d)
high blue collar concentration
e) lower concentration of foreign stock
f)
lower percent urban
g) higher percent rural
h) lower percent white collar occupations
i)
high percentage of Wallace votes
a)

b)

Significant indicators of the Miles vote, as judged by the R Square

Change
a)

b)
c)

d)
e)
f)

statistic:

(in

rank order)

percent vote for Wallace
median educational level
percent foreign stock
percent urban
percent blue collar
percent black
In final analysis of the Miles candidacy, the

appears

to

lawyer and civic leader

have suffered from his moderate position on the important open

housing question, as did Mr. Finan

.

Yet the former candidate could not

compile the amount of support garnered for the Attorney General.

we

This,

maintain, was the result of local political boss, Jack Pollack's inability to
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organize support for Miles as the Tawes Administration's state political
organization was to assist Mr. Finan.

Again, in the Miles case this time, Mr. Mahoney strategically compelled a candidate to assume a position on an issue not considered to be key
in the

campaign by the former Democrat;

campaign platform. Mr
ment

thrift,

.

this,

we judge simply by Mr.

Miles was not identified as the proponent

of

Miles

govern-

but was associated with a moderate open housing stand; thus

having the identical adverse affects upon both proponents and opponents

open occupancy earlier discussed with respect

to the

In conclusion to the discussion of the 1966

Primary,

it

is

Finan candidacy.

Maryland Democratic

maintained that electoral preference was based upon the salient

issue of open housing

— an

issue strategically approached by Mr. Mahoney,

and a strategy we can best describe as
in 1965,

of

politically expedient (a year earlier,

Mr. Mahoney had publicly expressed his support

Three major factors indicate the
candidate selection:

(1)

role played

by

for

open occupancy)

this issue in determining

the two candidates most polarized on integrated

housing received the majority of votes

(2)

on other issues cited within our

discussion, close similarity exists among the positions taken by the candidates

(3)

the victory of the single-issue oriented (anti-open occupancy)

candidate, George Mahoney, illustrates the important nature

determining electoral preference.

of the

issue in
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Additionally,

it

seems as though the candidacy

stantially lessened the chances of

of

Mr. Finan sub-

Mr. Sickles. Consideration

of

two key

characteristics of each candidate's support indicate popularity from areas

distinguished by a lower concentration of blacks and regions that demonstrated a lower percentage vote for Wallace.

vote among such areas

.

This appears

Piedmont where Sickles compiled 25%

and 25%

for

Mahoney; and

of the vote

of the vote,

this to the

disadvantage

compared

to

Maryland

36% for Finan

to

23% for Finan and 38%

that Finan compiled 20 to 30

of 90 to 100

of Sickles

compared

in

Standard Metropolitan Area

Mahoney. We have previously indicated

percent of the black vote in areas

the candidates split the

have been the case

in the Baltimore

where Sickles received 23%
for

to

Thus

percent black population,

who compiled approximately 70%

of

such

vote.
It is

possible, however, that the candidacy of Mr. Sickles lessened

the chances of Mr. Finan being elected.

candidacy, and the alternatives

of

Given the absence

of the Sickles

Mahoney, Finan, and Miles, the

electorall.y

significant, liberal Washington, D.C. Standard Metropolitan Area, a

significant portion of the Baltimore Standard Metropolitan Area, organized

labor, the entire black vote, and the support garnered by the state party

organization, would have seemingly resulted in a victory for the Attorney

General
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The candidacy
with

of

Mr Finan where
.

the former candidate

Mr. Miles had two possible

affects.

Given a similarity

position on the issue of open occupancy was concerned,

may have taken

among those who favored

potential votes from the Attorney General

a moderate stand on this question; both Richard

Walsh and William Lloyd Fox indicate

this

i

A History, 1632-197 4. ^

n Maryland:

Yet given the marginal support rendered for the Miles candidacy,

have been essential for Mr. Finan

Mr. Miles received

to

to

have received almost

have won the primary.

all of

A second possible

Miles candidacy, judged by our quantitative analysis,

is that

it

would

the votes
affect of the

the candidate

simply prevented Mr. Mahoney from receiving greater support in the

primary due

Mahoney

to the

still

won

former candidate's vote

in

Queen Anne's County; however,

the Upper Eastern Shore area by 3% over Mr. Finan.

Note that the characteristics indicative of support for the Mahoney and Miles
candidacies are identical with respect

to all

the implications of Miles taking votes from

SES-demographic variables, yet

Mahoney are minimal, again

given the former candidate's poor showing electorally.

Whether the Mahoney strategy would have been successful

in a

two

candidate race appears doubtful, given the support registered for candidates
with views on open occupancy different than that of this Democrat.
is

merely speculation and furthermore,

here.

In fact,

is

Yet this

not the topic of our discussion

given a multi-candidate primary, and a potentially salient
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issue, Mr. Mahoney's strategy of capitalizing on these circumstances enabled

him

to

win the primary with 33%

of the vote.

However, doubt as

sible success of an individual in a two candidate race

are based entirely on an anti-open occupancy stand,

whose
is a

to the

pos-

political fortunes

relevant concern

with respect to the general election.

Discussion of the Maryland Republican Primary can be quickly dis-

missed.

Baltimore County Executive, Spiro Agnew, holding the most

important administrative office of

all

Republicans

in the state, easily re-

OO

ceived his party's nomination with 84%

Running on

of the vote in a five

candidate race.

a platform of tax reform, the candidate's closest rival compiled

8% of the vote
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Primary Election Results
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Economic Areas by County
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CHAPTER

IV

THE GENERAL ELECTION

Initial

analysis of the general election indicates that Republican

Spiro Agnew's victory pivoted upon substantial leads in Montgomery County
(37,000)

,

He carried

Baltimore City (24,000)
all of

and Prince Georges County (14,000)

,

.

Western Maryland and Maryland Piedmont (traditional

Republican areas)

,

the Eastern Shore counties of Talbot and Wicomico, and

Harford County, northeast of Baltimore City.
received 455,318 votes compared

(Agnew compiled 50%

of the vote

to

The former County Executive

373,543 for the Democrat, Mahoney;

compared

to 40% for

Mahoney)

open housing candidate won eleven counties situated

in

.

The

anti-

Eastern Shore and

Southern Maryland, and Anne Arundel and Baltimore Counties, politico-

economic units

of the Baltimore

ethnic support gave
of the

Standard Metropolitan Area.

Agnew over

Additional study of the Democrat's support reveals that

George Wallace

of

80% of the black vote, approximately 75%

Jewish vote and Mahoney heavy majorities among

that voted for

Estimates

in the 1964 Presidential

Italians

of

and Slavs.

the sixteen counties

Primary, Mr. Mahoney

received majorities in twelve (primarily Eastern Shore and Southern Maryland

87
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counties)

.

The Alabama Governor received 57% support from

the aforemen-

tioned cluster of counties compared to 53% for Mahoney two years later.

wide, Wallace received 44%

of the vote contrasted with 40% for the

Democratic gubernatorial candidate.

State-

Maryland

So that with minimal exception, those

counties attracted to the Wallace candidacy in 1964, cast support for Mahoney
in 1966 with similar fervor.

(Jim Lucas, in

Agnew:

Profile in Conflict

reports that the Mahoney candidacy may have suffered

to

some extent,

,

in

Eastern Shore and Southern Maryland, due to traditional anti-Catholic feeling
in those areas

^
.

)

Basically, Mr.

mentioned majorities
state's voters)

Agnew was
in

populous Baltimore City (which contains 52%

of the

and the traditionally liberal Washington suburbs (Montgomery

and Prince Georges Counties)
reside.

able to win the election due to previously

,

where 24%

Mahoney was victorious

of

Maryland's registered voters

in thirteen of the state's

twenty-three

counties, most of them less populated rural areas with the exception

Baltimore and Anne Arundel Counties.

of

Eastern Shore and Southern Mary-

land, casting majority support for the Democrat, represent only 11% and 2%
of the state's voting population respectively.

was victorious

in

Lastly, even though

Mahoney

populous Anne Arundel and Baltimore Counties, the

candidate's margin of victory in these areas, (6,000 and 13,000 respectively)

,
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was not

sufficient to offset

Agnew's support

in the

above-mentioned regions.

Further description of the 1966 Maryland Gubernatorial Election
requires

ment

of

(1)

a consideration of the "politics" of the campaign

county candidate preference patterns.

It is

(2)

a treat-

suggested that the

governor's race was single issue oriented and that an investigation
electoral behavior must

toward open housing.

depend upon a study

Treatment

of

of

of candidate policy orientation

secondary issues

in the

campaign

is

significant in illustrating the relative similarity between candidates on

policy stance and therefore the increased role assigned to the open occupancy

issue as a determinant of electoral preference.
It

can be hypothesized that the political strategy

George Mahoney, was based upon the popularity
candidacy

in the 1964

of the

of the

Democrat,

George Wallace

Maryland Democratic Presidential Primary where the

Alabama Governor received 44%

of the vote.

Implied, here,

is

a positive

association between the appeal for the segregationist policy orientations

Wallace and the anti-open occupancy position of Mahoney.
criticism of the

Mahoney candidacy, by

of

In fact, major

the Baltimore City press and

opposition candidate Agnew, centered upon the Democrat's failure to concern
himself with issues other than open occupancy.

involved campaigning on a single issue.

The Mahoney

strategy, then,

The Democrat adopted a

position on
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this issue that he perceived capable of attracting votes, based

upon the

success of the Wallace candidacy two years earlier.
Specifically, the sentiment expressed by the candidate vis-a-vis open

housing

owner

,

was

that such a policy infringed

to sell or rent his

property

a political advertisement that

an open housing

bill is

violate the law

I

owner's right
chooses."

.

am

to jail

Agnew and

a

if

"If

you

way he

potential supporters

by declaring

would never be open occupancy

measure.

in

any law which takes away the home

Mahoney had assured

Earlier,

to attack the

Sun newspaper:

passed, you can be fined and sent

in opposition to

would veto such

candidate

in the Baltimore

or rent the home in which he lives in any

to sell

home

of the

whomever he wanted. Said Mahoney

appeared

that should he be elected, there
for he

to

upon the freedom

in

Maryland

Throughout the campaign, Republican

a lesser Independent hopeful had seized an opportunity

Democrat's open housing stand by declaring that the issue was

a federal matter as opposed to a state concern.

The

rationale here,

was

that

since possible open occupancy legislation would originate from the national

congress,

if

week prior
legislation

at all, talk of the

to election

was

governor's veto power was irrelevant.

day, when confronted with the fact that open occupancy

a federal concern, on "Eyewitness

television program)

,

One

Newsmakers"

(a local

the candidate confessed that he would submit to national

legislation on integrated housing.^

Most significant

is

the realization of the
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candidate's awareness of the status of the issue throughout the campaign,
yet his continued pledge to veto such legislation as governor.

The campaign
County Executive,

for the candidacy of Republican Spiro

stalled during the initial stages

inability to focus attention

away from

due

Agnew, Baltimore

to the candidate's

the issue of open housing

Agnew 's

.

self-perceived political attraction rested with his ability to draw attention to
his

proposed tax reform measures for the

ment became apparent when he found

it

The Republican's predica-

state.

seemingly essential

to

narrow the

disparity between himself and the Democrat on the open occupancy question.

The County Executive likewise claimed

that he

lation affecting the right of the individual

whomever he wished.

(A

pancy was a federal issue)

month

later

would veto any housing legis-

home owner

Agnew would

to sell his

property

to

claim that open occu-

.

So that Agnew's strategy was to narrow differences between himself and

Mahoney vis-a-vis the

position on housing (thus attracting attention to other

issues, particularly tax reform)

"backfired" on the Republican.

.

However, the pursuit

By addressing

of this

strategy

the open housing issue and

attempting to create a similarity between himself and the Democrat, the
issue

due

commanded greater

to his position

attention and a greater potential vote for

on integrated housing dating back

had not mentioned the question of open occupancy

to the

in the

Mahoney

primary (Agnew

Republican primary)

.
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Very simply analyzed,

in a state that is heavily Democratic,

(Democrats outnumber Republicans

3 to 1)

are perceived as taking the identical stand

Democrat.

Later realizing this,

,

,

Agnew was

where the two major candidates
the advantage rests with the
to revise his

stand declaring in late October that should such a
majority sentiment

The

and pass

last stage of

bill

in the State Legislature,

Agnew

1

s

such as Maryland

open occupancy

receive support "by a

he v/ould not veto

it.^

policy change toward integrated housing was

a declaration that the issue was a concern to be debated in the national

congress and therefore not a relevant gubernatorial campaign matter.

key strategy

at this point

was the

initiation of personal attacks

questioning the Democrat's competence and knowledge

economic problems

During the

was

initiated

upon Mahoney,

of the state's socio-

.

initial

stages of the gubernatorial campaign, the offensive

by Mahoney's position on

perceived strength.

a single issue, the candidate's self-

The Republican, Agnew, was compelled

to revise his

strategy several times as a response to the Mahoney initiative.
to

A

By attempting

narrow the disparity between himself and the Democrat on the open hous-

ing question, in essence, the County Executive placed himself on the

defensive.

Only upon adopting the

last of three strategies, i.e.

declaring

the issue a federal matter and therefore not a concern for a gubernatorial

race, did the candidate assume a more offensive plan.

The significance
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of this offensive-defensive

dichotomy has particular implications

Agnew candidacy. Key Republican
of the state's

initiative.

reflect the

Democratic majority,

The Republican's
accuracy

strategists had commented, that because

it

was

last of three

of this evaluation.

essential that

Agnew

take the

campaign strategies appeared

Key phrases

that

appeared in

the Republican's speeches throughout the campaign reflect this.
the electorate of the Democrat's stand on open housing,

Maryland as

for the

Agnew

to

all of

Reminding

referred to

a "potential Maddoxville"^ (in reference to Segregationist Lester

Maddox, Governor

of Georgia)

,

should Mahoney be elected.

Another

familiar phrase of the Republican, signaling his realization of the significance
of

Maryland's

3 to

1

Democratic ratio, was that given the Democrat's position

on open occupancy, "this time party loyalty demands too much."^

So that, in summary, Agnew's campaign strategy reflected three, basic
stages
1)

the first stage

where Agnew attempted

to

narrow policy differences be-

tween himself and the Democrat on the open occupancy issue thus hoping

to

create greater public attention upon other issues
2)

the second stage

where Agnew attempted

on open occupancy, creating a degree

Mahoney; the

affect of this strategy

thus attracting greater attention,

to

present himself as a moderate

of disparity

was

to

still, to

between himself and

admit the relevancy

the

of the issue,

Mahoney candidacy
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3)

the third stage

where the Republican attempted

defensive (or place himself on the offensive)

concern for other issues,

and not a concern

in declaring

,

to place

Mahoney on the

thereby creating greater public

open occupancy a federal question

of state politics

Further investigation of the 1966 governor's race indicates that the
Republican's third stage strategy was met with only limited success, i.e.,
electoral preference ultimately

response

to

was decided based upon

a positive or negative

Mahoney's open housing position rather than reaction

to the tax

reform proposals, or stands taken on other secondary issues by the Republican.

Of key significance vis-a-vis the position taken by

housing during the third stage

of his strategy,

Agnew on open

was the perception among the

electorate of a policy alternative relative to Mahoney.

So that a negative

reaction to the Democrat's stand on the open occupancy issue
a positive response to the
that since an attraction for

response

to

Agnew candidacy. Noteworthy,

is

is

equated with

the suggestion

Agnew may have been dependent upon

a negative

Mahoney's open housing stand (given the Democratic majority

the state) at no time did the Republican actually

command

the initiative or

take the offensive in the campaign.

According

to

Agnew, the major concern

for the State in 1966 (and

therefore the key issue in the election) was the inadequacy of the present
tax structure.

Such an evaluation

of

Maryland's socio-economic status,

in

in
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was shared by the

this regard,

bury Daily Times newspapers
publication, i.e.
to

open housing,

locally influential Baltimore

Sun and

The sentiment expressed by

.

Salis-

the latter

the major significance of the tax reform issue as opposed
is

noteworthy

in that the

Times originates from the rurally

conservative, Southern oriented, Lower Eastern Shore where prime concern
in this election

might expect

problem

Maryland tax structure reflected

in the

to

be over the issue

competition between the state and

its

of

a continuous conflict and

various local subdivisions vis-a-vis

the ability to collect and distribute such revenues.

government's ability

to collect taxes

earnings tax since the collection

by the

state.

On

open occupancy. The

was

of sales

As

of 1966, the local

limited to an unpopular property and

and income taxes was pre-empted

the average, only one dollar of every four dollars and fifty

cents collected by the state was redistributed to the local sub-division.

problem

of

such a tax structure

is

7

The

realized in that local areas were chiefly

responsible for maintaining a certain quality and quantity

of

public services.

Those sectors most frequently mentioned as suffering from the inadequacy
of

revenue were public education and safety.
Both candidates agreed that the tax structure needed revamping, yet

the Democrat, Mahoney, in focusing his campaign totally upon an anti-open

housing stand, did not address the former issue in much detail.
in the tax system, advocated

by Agnew, entailed an abolishment

The revision
of

the
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unpopular property and earnings tax.
for a

more centralized tax system,

i.e.

In addition, the Republican called

the state should assume partial

financial responsibility in maintaining particular local public services,
e.g.,

the Baltimore City Police Department and the construction of public school
facilities, particularly in the City.

Simultaneously,

Agnew proposed

that

the state redistribute one of every three dollars collected, back to the local

subdivision.

Given the need for additional monies for the upkeep and main-

tenance of the police department in local areas (especially Baltimore City)

,

the City public school system, and an increase in wages for teachers, police,

and state

civil servants, the

state taxes

The

County Executive expressed the

would necessarily increase by 1968.
tax revision proposal, in

Hughes Amendment, met with

many respects

such counties were "footing the

Baltimore City.

This had also been the concern

when

the aforementioned

effect, called for a

similar to the 1965 Cooper-

limited opposition in the wealthier counties due

to a feeling that

1965

belief that

bill" for

of the

public services in

wealthy counties in

amendment was defeated. The Amendment,

graduated tax structure.

open occupancy was the key, salient issue

in

(Our previous assertion that

determining candidate prefer-

ence appears additionally valid here given the electoral support for the

Agnew candidacy among

the wealthier counties, despite opposition to an

aspect of his tax reform proposal.)

in

Very simply, reaction

to

Agnew

1

s

tax
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reform proposals was not a major criteria for electoral
preference.
candidate preference appears, more than not,

to

Again,

have been a function

of a

rejection or acceptance of Mahoney's stand on open
occupancy.

The Democratic candidate had likewise expressed

a desire to abolish

the unpopular property and earnings taxes while simultaneously
citing the

need for increases in public services,

i.e.

,

improvements

in the police

department, increased school construction, increased wages for teachers,

policemen and civil servants, etc. Yet unlike Agnew, Mahoney proposed
a

TAX CUT

on both the state and local level

increased and wages raised)

.

,

in

response, referred

in attempting to present
In

League

answer

of

Women

such

to a position

while services were to be

"Business-like efficiency" would enable an

increase in services while allowing taxes
Baltimore Sun

(this,

to

to the

be cut, stated Mahoney.® The

Democrat as a "flim-flam

artist"

a policy as a legitimate possibility 9
.

questionnaire submitted

to

Mahoney by the

Voters, the candidate suggested public ownership

of

metro-

politan area transit companies, the development of a rapid transit system,

better equipped police, a police morale
in

it

program (which included an increase

wages and a get tough policy with criminals — "to

was termed)

tional schools,

were

to

^

hit first

and

fire first" as

an increase in teachers' pay, teachers' colleges and voca-

and an assault upon water pollution.

These programs again,

be initiated despite an across-the-board tax cut on both the state and
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(The Democrat adhered

local level.

campaign,

to

an

official policy

throughout the

non-debate with the other candidates (Agnew and a lesser

of

Independent)

)

.

In effect, at no time

was Mahoney required

the rationality or feasibility of his programs and policies.

to publicly

defend

The candidate

accepted invitations from selected civic organizations where there was a

guarantee that opposition candidates would not appear or were not invited.
In

most cases, such civic organizations sought reassurance by the Democrat,

of his

pledge against open housing.

Often, other issues, such as tax reform

were not discussed. The Democrat's reasoning

in not

addressing or debat-

ing with the other candidates was that he was not running against any single

The Salisbury Times had

individual but "the state of things as they are.

attacked such reasoning by claiming Mahoney's association with the present

Democratic Administration in Annapolis, i.e., he had received the incumbent
governor's endorsement and had benefitted from the Administration's
traditional financial backers (this referred primarily to

George Hocker)

.

The same newspaper had referred
1

non-debate as "insulting

to the voters of

Maryland

such behavior as an "indication

had referred

to

of the issues

and his general incompetence."^

comment on
if

a possible

program

to facilitate tax

i

to

brewery millionaire,
Mahoney's policy

O

of the

while the Baltimore Sun

Democrat's ignorance

In fact,

Mahoney's only

reform in Maryland was that,

elected, he v/ould appoint a blue-ribbon panel to study waste and in-

efficiency in government.

of
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answer

In
of

Women

to a position

to

Agnew by

the League

Voters, the candidate suggested a more equitable distribution

burden among

the tax

questionnaire submitted

fiscal crisis in

all

citizens and an assault, particularly, upon the

urban subdivisions, co-ordinated planning

an assault upon water pollution, increases in wages
officials, teachers,

and

of

civil servants)

,

in transportation

enforcement

(lav;

and improvement

in the public

school system, especially school building construction.

Noteworthy
beneficial to

e.g.

a

is

the Republican candidate's emphasis on policies

urban areas and programs generally perceived as "liberal,"

more equitable distribution

of the tax

burden, a more centralized

tax structure (more state responsibility for local services

Baltimore City)
to

.

In seeking the

— especially

in

urban, liberal vote, the Republican appeared

have realized his slim chances for gathering massive rural conservative

support (save traditionally Republican Western Maryland)
to the

stand on open occupancy.

,

in great part

(We refer here, specifically,

due

to the rural

conservative vote in Southern, Upper and Lower Eastern Shore Maryland
respectively.)

The Baltimore Sun had reported Agnew

as publicly admitting

he would lose the entire conservative vote and a significant number
rural vote (later quantitative analysis confirms this)

compensate for
cratic party

14
.

this

(In

,

of the

but had hoped to

by capturing the liberal and urban vote within the Demoessence, the Republican hoped

to

gain the support
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garnered by the two major Democratic candidates who

primary (Carlton Sickles and Thomas Finan)

)

.

Both

lost to

of

Mahoney

in the

these candidates

had received overwhelming liberal, urban and black
support. Sickles and
Finan together accounted for 59% of the Democratic vote.
In evaluating the

two candidates' positions on open housing and on

"secondary issues" (issues other than integrated housing)
tax reform,

we suggest

that electoral behavior most likely

,

particularly

was based upon an

acceptance or rejection of the Democrat's anti-open housing stand.

Given

the Republican's third stage strategy, a policy alternative on this issue was

perceived.

Where the issue

of tax

less of a policy alternative, i.e.

reform was concerned, there appeared

both candidates proposed to abolish the

unpopular earnings and property taxes. Indeed, the chief concern over the
issue of tax reform, vis-a-vis voter response, appeared to be a question of
the Democrat's credibility in proposing a tax reduction while simultaneously
citing goals for

programs which obviously would demand increased funding.

(We previously cited the Salisbury Times where key consideration was given
to

Mahoney's failure

of tax reform)

,

to

debate with other candidates (especially on the issue

and the Baltimore Sun which referred

to the

Democrat's

questionable credibility vis-a-vis the feasibility of his tax proposals.)

appears

to indicate a basis for

open occupancy.

However, as

This

candidate preference on grounds other than
later quantitative analysis will indicate,
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Mahoney was victorious

in these areas in

which the aforementioned publica-

tions are located

Additional similarity among each candidate on secondary
issues

is

apparent in evaluating their positions as cited via the previously
mentioned

League

of

Women Voters

questionnaire.

Given an introduction as

to the policy orientations of the

two candi-

dates on open occupancy and other secondary issues,

we now want

approach a discussion

Agnew

of "the

effort requires a two-step

procedure:

organized, political support
preference.

Our

specific

Mahoney

(2)

vote" and "the
(1)

.

This

a discussion of each candidate's

is to

study the relationship between such

preferences and selected socio-economic variables in order

respect to Mahoney

vote."

a quantitative analysis of county candidate

purpose

characteristics of counties

to

common

to

support for

Selected variables include:

to

Agnew and

determine

the same with

percent black, percent

foreign stock, percent urban, percent rural, median income and education,

percent blue collar and white collar, and percent vote for Wallace in the 1964

Democratic Presidential Primary

in

Maryland.

In

order

to facilitate

such a

study, the state has been geographically sub-grouped into economic regions
as suggested by Bogue and Beale in Economic Areas of the United States

A discussion

of candidate organizational

with a major limitation in mind.

Knowledge

of

.^

support must be approached

such support does not
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necessarily indicate a pattern of county political preference or behavior

be suspected.
the

In other

words,

Agnew candidacy does

to state that

the Baltimore Sun supported

not indicate, necessarily, that Baltimore City or

the Baltimore Metropolitan Area supported the Republican.

Baltimore Metropolitan Area voted for Mahoney.

fact, the

to

Note that, in

An analysis

of

socio-economic characteristics, by county or economic region, appears

more dependable

in citing suspected candidate preference.

However, while a discussion

of

candidate organizational support

at

best represents an unreliable indication of ultimate electoral preference, such

an undertaking satisfactorily serves as an introduction

to

possible political

orientations and electoral patterns prior to SES analysis (our opening re-

marks on candidate campaign strategies and issues served

this

same

purpose)
If,

as

we already

stated, the

Agnew campaign

strategy was to seek the

favor of Democratic liberals, judging by the candidate's organizational

support, such a strategy appeared successful.

branch

of the

AFL-CIO)

,

Committee on

Both the Baltimore City

Political Education (the political

arm

of the

and the urban based Americans for Democratic Action (who

supported 85% of the state's Democratic candidates
support for the Republican.
policy with those

many

16

local,

In fact, the

ADA

in 1966)

,

indicated official

had adopted a "get tough"

Democratic candidates

it

was supporting (some
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receiving financial assistance)

,

claiming an immediate denunciation by the

organization, of any candidate that sanctioned or demonstrated support

Mahoney candidacy

for the

.

Dominic Fornano, head

the AFL-CIO, in addressing union

members

at a

of the local

"Citizens for

branch

Agnew"

of

rally,

had lauded the pro-labor record of the Republican as Baltimore County Executive.

17

(The organizational support

of the

AFL-CIO and COPE

in

particular

had limited affect upon the electoral behavior

of labor.)

overwhelmingly for Mahoney

our quantitative analysis.

is illustrated in

That labor voted
This

supports our assertion that organizational support does not necessarily
indicate a pattern of county or area candidate preference.

Other support for the Agnew candidacy originated from the Baltimor e

Sun

,

citing the Republican's "proven administrative ability" and

of the state's social

and economic problems," while denouncing the Mahoney

candidacy as a "racist campaign" and an "appeal
In addition, the Baltimore

.

to

prejudice and bigotry-" 1 ®

County Executive had compiled unified support

from the City's black population, where
registered vote

"knowledge

Agnew was

this

group accounted

to receive an incredible

for 35% of the

90% of the black vote

in

Baltimore City compared to 40% for the Republican gubernatorial candidate
in 1962; a majority of this vote originating

District.

19

from the predominately black 4th

Throughout the campaign, Agnew had cpenly received the support
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of Baltimore's

Mitchell and

two most influential black politicians, State Senators Clarence

Verda Welcome.*^

In addition to the support generated in the City's predominately black

4th District,
5th District.

Agnew gathered

further votes in the "silk stocking," liberal

Republican support in these two districts

is

especially signifi-

cant given the traditional stronghold in these areas by Democratic political

boss Jack Pollack.

Of interest in the 1966 election

is

the political conflict

between Pollack's established Trenton Democratic Club, comprised
guard" party workers dating back

to

immediate post World War

II,

of "old

and the

newly formed, predominately black Fourth District Democratic Organization.

The

ability of the Republican to

Districts, then,

seemed

garner support from the Fourth and Fifth

to indicate the

organization's control over the area.
indicating the

breakdown

beginning

of the

end

of the Pollack

(As a sidenote, perhaps further

of the Pollack

machine, State Senator Clarence

Mitchell (backed by the Fourth District Democratic Organization) easily

defeated his Pollack supported opponent.
In addition to seeking the traditional liberal Democratic and black

votes,

Agnew

attempted to remain in favor with Maryland's only

can counties (Allegany and Garrett Counties)
to

have been as salient

of

.

seems

to

imply

this)

Republi-

Open occupancy appears

an issue here, relative to ether areas

(later quantitative analysis

tw’o

.

not

in the state

Surprisingly enough, the
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Cumberland Morning News

,

in stating that both candidates advocated the

identical open housing stand, cited the Democrat

choice due

to his

Mahoney

as the preferred

"proven business expertise" (Mahoney's construction
O

business enabled him

to

become

a millionaire)

.

1

It

was thought

that the

Democrat's abilities would best assure a positive business climate as opposed
to the administrative expertise of

Agnew. Noteworthy

is

the Beale and

Bogue

description of Allegany and Garrett Counties where economic recessions in
the state are first to affect this area.
in this

Western Maryland area appears not

choice based upon secondary issues

versus "administrative expertise")
support for Agnew.)
tive

(Again, however, candidate preference

response

to

the

We suggest

,

(in this

of a

case, "business expertise"

that such support
(in

was based upon

a nega-

an area where open occupancy

in part, to an insignificant

was not a relevant issue due,
to

have been a function

as judged by the ultimate electoral

Mahoney candidacy

and the Democrat's failure

to

number

of

address other issues in depth relative

blacks)

,

to the

Republican
Definitely surprising

was the support rendered

by the Salisbury Daily Times

,

to the

Agnew candidacy

which we mentioned originates from the rurally

conservative lower Eastern Shore portion

of

Maryland.

Note that George

Wallace received approximately 68% of the vote in 1964 in this area.

newspaper

cited, in a "Voter's Right to

Know"

The

editorial, "the Democrat's
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insulting behavior in refusing to debate the issues with the other
candidates

and his failure
issues."

to accept

numerous

invitations by civic groups to discuss

In addition, the publication attacked

Mahoney's association with

the "Tawes-Hocker Regime" (as previously stated, the Democrat rationalized
his policy of non-debate with other candidates in that he

the state of things as they are")
tion candidate
in his duties

Thomas Finan

22

Ironically,

,

in the

and associated with a corrupt government (Finan was the Attor-

the general election had begun,

Tawes regime. So

support for

However,

(in this

of

it is

.

Nov/ that the campaigning for

Mahoney had graciously accepted

the support

that in retrospect, the Salisbury newspaper's

Agnew appeared

candidacy as opposed
stand.

Mahoney had attacked opposi-

Democratic primary as being delinquent

ney General under the Tawes Administration)

of the

was "running against

as a function of dissatisfaction with the

to satisfaction

wiih the Republican's open housing

again important

case support from the press)

county electoral behavior.

election returns demonstrate

Mahoney

,

to realize that

organizational support

does not especially indicate a pattern

Note that quantitative analysis and voter

overwhelming support

for

Mahoney

in this

Eastern Shore region.
In analyzing the support behind the
to briefly

1966.

Mahoney candidacy

,

it

is

essential

discuss the proceedings of the State Democratic Convention in

It is

accurate to state that the Democratic candidate represented a
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divided party (he received 33% of the vote in the primary)
conflicts

among party members

due mostly

In fact, the

many Democrats during

negative response to Mahoney's "Your

above prospect had been

the primary, given the significant

Home

indicative of his anti-open housing stand.

is

Your Castle--Protect

Both

of

at

any time.

In addition, chief

It"

theme

Maryland's Democratic

U.S. Senators, Joseph Tydings and Daniel Brewster, refused

endorse Mahoney

to

as to what official position Democrats should

adopt on the open occupancy issue.
the concern of

,

to publicly

Democratic rival in the

past primary, Carlton Sickles, publicly denounced the Mahoney candidacy
as "racist" just prior to the Convention, as did lesser Democratic rival

Clarence Miles

The other major opposition

to

Mahoney

in the

Democratic

Primary, Attorney General Thomas Finan, ultimately supported the
Democratic representative after he succumbed

Tawes' "party loyalty politics."

to the

pressure

of

Governor

(Curiously enough, the former Attorney

General later received a state judgeship

— weeks

prior to the general election)

Significant, however, is the lack of support apparent within the Maryland

Democratic Party for the Mahoney candidacy

Mahoney's response

was

to

in attempting to confront this

"pack" key Convention committees, the platform committee

lar, with advocates of his anti-open

of

problem

such a strategy

in

of

disunity

in parti cu

occupancy stand. Realizing the pursuit

advance, the response

of the

out-numbered, liberal

.
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element (out-numbered vis-a-vis positions held
boycott the Convention.

key committees)

was

to

Nevertheless, a "rubber stamp" vote was taken

at

in

,

the Convention on whether to officially adopt the slogan "Your

Home

Castle-Protect

By

It"

(along with the implications of the slogan)

margin, the slogan was adopted as the

official policy

.

is

Your

a 138-45

on open occupancy in

Maryland by the State Democratic Party. Chief dissent, among those who

were present

at the

gathering, originated from Baltimore City's 4th and 5th

Districts and the wealthy, liberal, Washington

D.C. suburban counties

of

the state.

The overall

affect of these events at the

Convention was Mahoney's

reliance upon "old guard" Democrats to build a coalition of popular and

organizational support.

Such Democrats included the aforementioned Jack

Pollack, political boss in Baltimore City, Emerson Harrington Jr., aged 72,

an unofficial Democratic organizer in Eastern Shore Dorchester County

(whose father, in the typical Eastern Shore Maryland aristocratic style, was

once governor of the

state)

;

Wilbur Dulin

,

former state senator from the

Baltimore Metropolitan Area's Anne Arundel County, who had been politically
inactive since 1956; Philip Dorsey, Jr.
in

who was presently

Southern Maryland and whose son was running for

a circuit judge

state senator

,

and

24
George Hocker, brewery monopolist and perennial Democratic fund raiser
•

It

was most

likely the activities of these individuals that assisted in the
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creation of a favorable image of the

Mahoney candidacy

Annapolis Evening Capital newspaper.

Anne Arundel County, described

as expressed by the

The publication, originating from

the Democrat as "a protector of the

man against growing federal intervention

in states'

little

and individual rights." 25

(Interestingly enough, the George Wallace candidacy in 1964 had been

described in a like manner.)

The

Capital

,

in declaring its

support for the

Democrat, stated that while Agnew's administrative experience made him a

more acceptable candidate

to the entire state, the

occupancy was more acceptable
emphasis attributed
indicates that
It

to

to the issue of

Anne Arundel County voters
open occupancy

Anne Arundel County indeed voted

seems apparent,

Mahoney position on open

in discussing the

for

Mahoney)

.

Mahoney candidacy, originating

was possibly the single most

1966 gubernatorial election.

Note the

(later electoral analysis

with the conflict in the Convention and given the comments
Capital, that open housing

.

of the

Evening

salient issue in the

Typically enough, the Democrat received the

unsolicited yet accepted support of the Maryland branch of the National States'

Rights Party and the Interstate Ku Klux Klan
In consideration of the

Mahoney candidacy

as single issue oriented

toward open housing, the Baltimore Su n predicted widespread appeal

Democrat

in the rural,

for the

conservative areas of Southern and Eastern Shore

Maryland, with the Baltimore Metropolitan Area considered a "toss up."

27

no
The Republican, Agnew, was predicted support

in traditionally

Republican Western Maryland, Piedmont Maryland, where open occupancy

was not seen as

a major issue relative to other regions in the state, the

Washington D.C. suburban counties, the "heart"

of

Maryland liberalism, with

the Baltimore Metropolitan Area considered as a struggle.

Predicted Areas of Support for

90

Agnew “

c)

Western Maryland
Washington D .C suburban area
Piedmont Maryland

d)

possibility of the Baltimore Metropolitan Area

a)

b)

.

ABOVE REGIONS' PERCENT OF STATE'S VOTING POPULATION

90%

EXCLUSIVE OF BALTIMORE METROPOLITAN AREA 38%
Predicted Areas of Support for Mahone y^

c)

Lower Eastern Shore Maryland
Upper Eastern Shore Maryland
Southern Maryland

d)

possibility of the Baltimore Metropolitan

a)

b)

Area

ABOVE REGIONS' PERCENT OF STATE'S VOTING POPULATION
EXCLUSIVE OF BALTIMORE METROPOLITAN AREA
A quantitative analysis

of selected

11%

demographic and socio-economic

variables will allow an accurate definition of the composition
vote" and "the

propose

Agnew

to utilize

vote."

63%

of "the

Mahoney

In order to facilitate such an undertaking,

we

Pearson's Correlation and Multiple Regression statistics.

As previously mentioned, selected variables include:

(a)

percent vote for

Ill

Wallace
(e)

(b)

percent black

percent blue collar

cent rural

(i)

(f)

(c)

median income

(d)

percent foreign stock

median educational level
(g)

percent urban

per-

(h)

percent white collar

In the analysis of

economic areas)

,

county candidate preference (sub-grouped into seven

we discover most

significant rates of correlation between

percent vote for Wallace and preference for Mahoney

(a

Pearson's

r of .7626);

secondly, a negative correlation of .4014 between percent urban and vote
registered for the Democrat; thirdly, a negative correlation of .3862 between

percent foreign stock and vote for Mahoney; a negative association

of .3092

between median income and vote for the candidate; a negative association

between median educational level and the 1966 Democratic vote
.

of .3069;

a

2976 relationship between percent black and support for the Mahoney can-

didacy; a positive .1632 relationship between the Mahoney vote and percent

blue collar; and a negative .1632 association between percent white collar

and the Democratic vote.

Such
"is

statistics indicate that 58% of the variance in the

explained" by the vote for Wallace in the 1964 Democratic Presidential

Primary.

Note that such evaluations are "county-by-county" and "region-by-

region," i.e.

all

data are aggregate in nature.

variance in the Mahoney vote
r

Mahoney vote

exists here, i.e.

is

Sixteen percent

of the

explained by percent urban (yet a negative

the greater urban the area, the less vote for the
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Democrat)

14% of the variance in this vote

;

is

explained by percent foreign

stock (again, a negative relationship exists thus having the identical affect
as the "urban" variable in

variance

its

relationship with the

Mahoney

explained by percent rural (since a positive

is

vote);

9% of the

exists here, the

r

greater the rural nature of the county or region, the greater the support
for the Democrat; 9% of the variance in the

Mahoney vote

educational level and median income level respectively
present)

.

In addition, 8% of the variance is explained

is

(a

explained by

negative

by percent black

positive relationship between percent black and the vote for

possibly reflects favorable reaction by white voters

open housing stand

in those regions

to the

the variance in the

Mahoney vote

is

Two

of

explained by percent blue collar; 2%

of

white collar (though a negative r exists, i.e.

workers

Democrat's anti-

percent

the variance in this particular electoral preference

of white collar

Mahoney

having a significant black population

does not, then, indicate black support for the Democrat.

Democrat)

is

Note that due to the prominence of the open occupancy issue, a

population.

It

r

is

explained by percent

the greater the percentage

in a region or county, the less the vote for the

.

So that the following characterization

of the

support for Mahoney

appears accurate, vis-a-vis county candidate preference.
candidate received support in those counties that

(in

The Democratic

ranking order via

113

significance of Pearson's

r)

,

demonstrated a support for the Wallace can-

didacy in 1964, had minute percentages

of foreign stock within their

boundaries, were characterized by lower levels

of

income and education, had

larger proportions of a black population, and were oriented toward blue
collar occupations.
In

order

to

further address the concern of the Mahoney vote,

as noted, a Multiple Regression analysis.

By analyzing both

we

utilize

the association

between a given SES variable and the Mahoney vote, and the explanatory
capacity of given variables, a more complete evaluation

preference factors in the 1966 Democratic vote

Regression analysis indicates that 58%
can be explained by the Wallace vote, i.e.

is

of

county candidate

presented.

of the

Mahoney

vote, by county,

those counties that indicated

significant support for Wallace in 1964, illustrated support for

1966.

Mahoney

in

Sixty-three percent of the Democratic vote in 1966 can be explained

from knowledge

of

both the Wallace vote and percent black in given counties

(percent black accounts for an increase in explanatory capacity of 5%)

.

The

percent Wallace vote, percent black, and percent foreign stock account for

an increase

to

65% in explanatory capacity (percent foreign stock accounting

for the increase of 2%)

.

A consideration

of the

Wallace vote, percent black,

percent foreign stock, and percent white collar enables our explanatory
ability to increase to 73% concerning the

Mahoney vote

(the variable "white

114

collar occupation" increases the ability to explain the Democratic vote by
8%)

The addition

of the variable,

"median educational level," given our above

stated variables, explains 74% of the

Mahoney vote

increases the rate of explanation by

1%)

phrase,

utilize the

(Rate of explanatory change as

.

addition of percent rural accounts for an
(therefore the explanation level for the
74%.

R Square Change

Given our previously stated variables

The

last variable,

Mahoney vote by

in this analysis,

total

The

than 1%

percent urban

explanatory capacity

median income, increases one's

less than 1% (an

of less

we

Mahoney vote remains approximately

accounts for an R Square Change of 1% and a
75%.

(this latter variable

referred to statistically as "R Square Change.")

is

.

R Square Change

of

ability to explain the

of .00027)

.

In total, then,

75% of the Mahoney vote can be explained given our selected variables in
quantitative analysis

.

So that

in

attempting to account for the Democratic

vote in 1966, judging by the statistic

variables are
cent black

(4)

(1)

R Square Change,

percent vote for Wallace

percent foreign stock

In order to analyze,

is

r

percent white collar

(3)

per-

median educational level.

Thirty-six percent

of the

variance in

explained by median educational level; 31%

variance in this particular vote

(where a negative

key explanative

what may be termed "the Agnew vote," the identi-

cal statistical technique is utilized.

the Republican vote

(5)

(2)

five,

exists)

,

is

of the

explained by the percent vote for Wallace

indicating the greater the support for
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Wallace among certain counties in 1964, the less support for

same counties

in 1966.

Republican's vote

variance

GOP

vote

is

variance in the

explained by the percent foreign stock; 19%

explained by percent blue collar

(a

negative

Eighteen percent of the variance in the

.

by the percent black

for

of the

in these

of

such

explained by percent white collar, 19% of the variance in the

is

latter case)

is

Twenty-seven percent

Agnew

in a

exists in this

r

Agnew

vote

given county (again, a negative

r

is

accounted

is

recorded)

analyzing this particular relationship, as we stated in the discussion

(In

Mahoney vote,

the

Mahoney's anti-open occupancy policy.)

wise, the less the percentage of blacks, e.g.

,

of

a significant percentage of blacks in a given area is cause

for favorable white reaction to

(.06% black)

.

Like-

Republican Western Maryland

the less favorable or less relevant the Democrat's position on

this issue tends to be.

The degree

to

which

a given county is rural, or

for 17% of the variance in the
in

terms of a negative

r

.

Agnew

urban each accounts

vote, with the former variable expressed

So that the Agnew vote

is

comprised

of

support

in

the urban areas; characterized further by higher income and higher educational level regions;

such regions have high concentrations

of

foreign stock,

are less populated by blacks, and are dominated by white collar occupations.
In addition, the counties supporting the

not to support Wallace in 1964.

Agnew candidacy

in 1966

tended
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Analyzing the Agnew vote in terms

of

Regression analysis, we discover

that 36% of the Republican's vote can be explained by

educational level.

With additional consideration

knowledge

of the

of

median

percent vote for

Wallace, the explanatory capacity of our analysis extends to 49% (an R

Square Change

of 12% is attributed to the Wallace vote)

Given the above

.

variables "median education" and "percent vote for Wallace," percent blue
collar enables us to account for 50% of the Republican's vote)

foreign stock accounts for an

R Square Change

account for 54% of the vote for this candidate.

of 4%,

.

Percent

enabling an ability to

Percent rural dees not signifi-

cantly increase the explanatory capacity of the analysis (R Square Change

equal to .00523); so that,

however, enables us
of 3%)

,

to

54% of the vote

account for 57% of the

is

explained

Agnew

.

Percent urban

vote (an R Square Change

while the addition of the variable, median income, represents an R

Square Change
explained.

of 1% (i.e., 58% of the

The addition

of only .00119

knowledge

GOP

candidate's support) can

of "percent black" accounts for an

of

Agnew candidacy. Our

now be

R Square Change

and therefore does not significantly increase our

explain support for the
a

still,

is

ability to

conclusion, here.,

is that

given

county or regional demographic and SES characteristics, via

quantitative analysis,

behavior patterns.
58% of the vote for

we can accurately suspect

Such an analysis permits us,

Agnew

particular county electoral
in addition, to explain

(75% of the vote for Mahoney)

.

In

Mahoney

sum, key explanatory variables vis-a-vis
vote" and "the

Agnew

classification of "the

vote" appear, in rank order, as follows:

Note that significance of variables in explaining candidate preference
the "rank order"

we have assigned

to

such variables)

is

a function of

(i.e.,

R

Square value

Common

Characteristics of Counties (Statewide)

Supportive of the Mahoney Candidacy
1)

2)
3)
4)

5)

high concentration of the Wallace vote in the 1964 Democratic primary
low percentage of white collar occupations
high concentration of black population
low concentration of foreign stock
lower median educational levels

Common

Characteristics of Counties (Statewide)

Supportive
1)

2)
3)

4)
5)

of the

Agnew Candidacy

higher median educational level
lower concentration of the Wallace vote
higher concentration of foreign stock
higher percent urban
lower percent blue collar

In order to increase the accuracy of our study (which suggests that

counties indicating an electoral preference for a particular candidate are

characterized by certain demographic, socio-economic conditions)

,

we pro-

pose an investigation of county candidate preference by "economic areas" as
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suggested by Bogue and Beale

According

to this

in

Economic Areas

technique, the state

is

of the

sub-grouped

United States

31
.

into a consideration of

Western Maryland, Maryland Piedmont, Lower and Upper Eastern Shore
respectively, the Baltimore Metropolitan Area, Southern Maryland, and the

Washington, D.C. suburban area.
Investigation of Western Maryland (Allegany and Garrett Counties)
indicates that this region supported

Mahoney. Given

common

to

this area.

Agnew by

this electoral preference,

52% compared to 37% for

key county characteristics

our definition of the support for Agnew ought
analyzing socio-economic characteristics

(In

to

be prevalent in

of a

given area,

i.e.

,

the classification of a region as a "blue collar area," "urbanized area,"

etc

,

the

.

mean average

of

such factors on the state level

is utilized as a

basis

for comparison

ANALYSIS OF VARIABLES

(Western Maryland)

This region voted 10% for the Wallace candidacy

in 1964

a state figure of 44% support for the Alabama Governor.

Thus

compared

the lower con-

centration of the Wallace vote appears as a factor in determining what

would expect

to

to

we

be an electoral preference for Agnew given the statewide

county analysis. Yet other characteristics common

support for Agnew are not common

to

to the state, indicating a

Western Maryland,

i.e.

the region

contains a high percentage of blue collar workers (63% compared to a state
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level of 56%)

the state)
11

yrs

,

,

has lower concentrations of foreign stock (3% compared to 6% for

has a slightly lower median educational level (10.4 contrasted

for the state as a whole)

60% for the

state)

,

and

is

considerably rural (73% compared

These are regional characteristics

.

indicate a preference for the Democrat

to

to

that at initial glance,

Mahoney rather than Agnew. Yet given

the fact that this area demonstrated candidate choice for the Republican, the

variable "percent vote for Wallace" must be singled out for
significance in accounting for such electoral behavior.

its

increased

In addition to a con-

sideration of factors that contribute to the support of the Republican nominee,

some recognition

of the

absence

of

key SES characteristics typical

support for Mahoney may be relevant
voted for Agnew.

in explaining

of the

why Western Maryland

Very simply, then, candidate preference can be analyzed

via a study of key demographic, SES factors that are present within a given

region (thus indicating
tion of the Wallace vote)

lack of support.

in the case of

,

,

Western Maryland

For example, the percent vote for Wallace was discovered

SES factor indicating support
of

blacks

the low concentra-

as well as key factors absen t that indicate possible

as the only key variable valid in suggesting support for

number

,

.

for the

Mahoney candidacy

Agnew. Yet
is a

This particular region contains a black population

and lack

of

support for the Mahoney candidacy.

key

significant

than 1% compared to the state mean of 18%--hence a factor indicative
lican support

a

of

of less

Repub-

This appears
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important in analyzing Agnew's victory over Mahoney in Western
Maryland.
Investigation of the Baltimore Metropolitan Area (Anne Arundel and

Baltimore Counties and Baltimore City) indicates that this region supported

Mahoney by 45% and Agnew 42%
other votes)

common

to

Given this electoral preference, key area characteristics

.

our definition

of the

ANALYSIS OF VARIABLES
Analysis
factors are
(b) a

(c)

(an Independent received the majority of

(a)

Mahoney support ought

to

be prevalent.

(Baltimore Metropolitan Area)

of this particular

region

is

rather difficult.

Common SES

a moderate median educational level--constant with the state

high concentration of foreign stock— 11% compared

a high degree of urbanization--85%

compared

— 47% contrasted to

to

36%

to

(d)

6% for the state
a lower percentage

of blue collar

occupations

The presence

of these factors indicate a suspicion of support for the

56%

candidacy, yet the region voted for Mahoney.

Two

variables,

it

Agnew

appears,

account substantially for the political behavior in this area; the percent vote
for Wallace and the percent black population.

A high concentration

of the

black population, we stated in analyzing county electoral behavior,

is

one

cause generating support, for the Mahoney candidacy. An investigation

of the

concentration of blacks in this region indicates that the Baltimore Metropolitan

Area

is

22% black compared with a rate

cf

18% for the entire state

In addition,
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we

find that 42% of this region voted for Wallace (a rate fairly constant
with

the state level of 44%)

.

In order to further analyze this region,

City from

its

two

satellite counties.

we must segregate Baltimore

While the Baltimore Metropolitan Area

supported Mahoney, the City did not (Agnew 47%, Mahoney 37%-- again the
majority of other votes to an Independent)
vote

is facilitated

Counties.

.

So that a study

Mahoney

of the

given a consideration of only Baltimore and Anne Arundel

With this restriction,

we discover

Wallace candidacy in 1964 (compared

to

a 48% rate of support for the

44% for the state)

picion of attraction for the Democrat Mahoney.

only reliable indicator

of

,

indicating a sus-

This variable appears as the

candidate choice in this region.

Excluding

Baltimore City, the median income and educational levels, percent white
collar are all inflated while percent black, percent blue collar are deflated
(yet

excluding the City, this region voted for Mahoney by 48%)

.

Consideration of Baltimore City indicates the following characteristics:
a high percentage black population (50%)
(9.9 yrs.)

,

,

a lower

median educational level

a lower percentage of white collar occupations (45%)

above figures are relative

to the

.

Baltimore Metropolitan Area, i.e.

(All

we

comparing Baltimore City with Baltimore and Anne Arundel Counties)
addressing characteristics
electoral preference for

.

are
In

of the City, initial observation suggests an

Mahoney. However,

a consideration of

urban con-
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centration --a factor indicating support for
for the region as a whole)
for the region)

for the

appears

,

(100% compared to 78%

percent vote for Wallace (31% for the City, 42%

to significantly

Agnew candidacy.

Agnew—

account for the support demonstrated

Additionally, the presence of a significant black

population appears to have two possible affects.
substantial black populace

may serve

to attract

As indicated previously, a
favorable reaction to

Mahoney's anti-open housing stand where whites are concerned.
words, open occupancy

is

very much

a salient or relevant issue.

appears accurate, however, only where there

is a

but not where blacks approach a majority, e.g.

In other

This analysis

significant black population,

Baltimore City.

In the latter

case, a concentration of blacks, in negative response to Mahoney's anti-open

housing position, demonstrated support for the Republican increasing the
latter's

chances for electoral victory.

In Baltimore City, then, the black vote assisted in off-setting the vote
of those whites attracted

presence

(The

by the Democrat's stand on integrated housing.

of the "white liberal" vote, particularly in Baltimore's

tioned 5th District can be said to have had a similar affect on the

often-men-

Mahoney

vote.

ANALYSIS OF VARIABLES (Piedmont Maryland)
Investigation of Piedmont Maryland (Carroll, Frederick, Harford,

Howard

,

and Washington Counties)

by 50% compared

to

,

indicates that this region voted for

43% for Mahoney. Given this preference, key area

Agnew
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characteristics

standing.

common

However,

in

to

our description

order

of the

Agnew

vote ought to be out-

to accurately analyze this region, a

technique

earlier referred to must be utilized, i.e.

candidate preference in Piedmont

Maryland must be studied via the absence

of

would indicate probable support

for

key SES factors whose presence

Mahoney. Naturally, reference

existence of SES characteristics in this region whose presence
of

support for

Agnew

is

its

indicative

likewise essential.

Piedmont Maryland's median educational level
the state as is

is

to the

concentration of foreign stock.

is identical to that of

The region has an urban

concentration of 34% (compared to 36% for the state) and a similar percent

blue colair occupations relative

to

the entire state.

the region do not compare favorably (that
not similar)

,

with those cited as

common

to the

higher median educational level (relative
of foreign stock,

blue collar,

(all

is to

Such characteristics

of

say such characteristics are

Agnew

to the state)

vote statewide, i.e.

,

higher concentration

higher percent urban, lower percent rural, lower percent
figures relative

to

the state)

.

In fact, the

above SES factors

do not permit an accurate evaluation of probable electoral behavior,

due

of

to the significant

degree

of similarity

between

this region

In retrospect, a correct assumption might suggest that

in part

and the

state.

Piedmont Maryland's

electoral behavior reflects that of the state in general, given identical SES

characteristics.

Yet

we remain concerned

in attempting to account for this
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region's preference for

mont Maryland voted

Agnew. Additional

for the

with 44% for the state)

,

candidacy

a factor

of

investigation reveals that Pied-

George Wallace by 32% (compared

which indicates probable preference

for the

Republican candidate. Further analysis illustrates that candidate preference
in this

area may be accounted for by the absence

characteristic found to be

Mahoney — the presence
is

common

of at least

one, major

in areas demonstrating a support for

of a significant black population.

but 5% black compared to 18% for the entire state.

Piedmont Maryland

So that in addressing a

single, yet important characteristic of areas supportive of the

didacy

(a

Agnew can-

low concentration of the vote for Wallace) and a major factor

indicative of support for

Mahoney

Maryland Piedmont lacks)

,

(a

significant black population

we have accounted

for

— which

two probable factors

responsible for electoral behavior and the subsequent support

of

Spiro

Agnew

in this region

ANALYSIS OF VARIABLES (Southern Maryland)
Investigation of Southern Maryland (Calvert, Charles, and St. Mary's

Counties)

,

indicates that the region voted for

41% for Agnew.

An

Mahoney by 57% compared

to

analysis of this area is not difficult as electoral behavior

can be accounted for via the aforementioned, key SES characteristics common
to the

Mahoney vote

in

our statewide consideration.

Southern Maryland

characterized by a high percent vote for Wallace in 1964 (53% compared

is

to
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44% for the state)

a high percent black population (29% compared to
18%)

,

low concentration

of foreign stock (5%

compared

to 6%)

,

a

,

and a median educa-

tional level identical to that of the entire state.

Each
is

of these characteristics,

possible, are elements

didacy.

common

to

save the latter variable where no analysis
areas supportive

of

From an alternative perspective, an investigation

Maryland reveals the absence
Republican, Agnew, i.e.

Mahoney can-

the

of those factors indicative of

Southern

of

support for the

higher median educational level, low concentra-

tion of the Wallace vote, high concentration of foreign stock,

urban concentration (Southern Maryland

is

88% rural)

and significant

.

ANALYSIS OF VARIABLES (Washington, D.C. Metropolitan Area)
Investigation of the Washington, D.C. Metropolitan Area (units within

Maryland include Montgomery and Prince Georges Counties)

Agnew compared

63% of this region voted for
is

to

indicates that

,

33% for Mahoney.

This area

distinguished by a higher median educational level (14 yrs. contrasted

with 11 yrs. for the state as a whole)
vote (29% compared to 44%)

contrasted to 6%)

,

,

,

a

lower concentration

of the

a higher concentration of foreign stock (17%

a high degree of urbanization (91%

compared

a lower rate of blue collar occupations (28% contrasted to 56%)
In addition,

Wallace

we would suspect support

for the

to 36%)

,

and

.

Agnew candidacy

region due to the absence of SES and demographic factors common

to

in this

areas
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supportive of the Mahoney candidacy, i.e.

a significant Wallace vote, low

,

concentration of foreign stock, significant black population (the region’s

black population

is

13% compared to 18% for the state)

these SES characteristics found to be

Mahoney candidacy on

common

a statewide level

Washington, D.C. Metropolitan Area

is

support for the Democrat, will be found

of

,

(Reference to

etc.

areas supportive of the

may prove

Where the

useful.)

concerned, such factors indicative

of

be absent.

to

ANALYSIS OF VARIABLES (Upper Eastern Shore Maryland)
Investigation of

Upper Eastern Shore Maryland

Anne's, Kent, and Talbot Counties)

Mahoney by 51% compared

to

45% for

,

(Caroline, Cecil,

indicates that the region voted for

Agnew

The area voted 53%

.

for

George

Wallace in 1964 (compared with the frequently mentioned state figure
contains a black population of 21% (18% for the state)

$8000 (compared with $9400 for the state)

yrs. (11 yrs

.

for the state)

,

is

,

,

median educational level

a

66% blue collar (56% for the

pond

to those

of 60% for the state)

of 44%)

has a median income

foreign stock populated (contrasted with 6% for the state)

(compared with a figure

Queen

.

,

state)

,

of

of 10

and 5%

and 70% rural

These characteristics corres-

previously mentioned as indicators of the Mahoney vote,

i.e.

a high concentration of the Wallace vote, low concentration of foreign stock,

high concentration of blacks, etc.
of those factors indicative of

Additional investigation reveals the absence

support for the Republican, Agnew, i.e., high
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concentration of urbanization, higher level of education, higher rate
collar occupations, etc.

So that electoral preference

of

white

in this region is easily

accounted for.
It is

noteworthy that

of the five counties classified as

"Upper Eastern

Shore Maryland," Talbot County voted for Agnew by 51% compared

Mahoney. This particular county
tional level (10.5 yrs.

compared

is

to

46% for

distinguished by a higher median educa-

to 10 yrs. for the region)

and

is

29% urban

(contrasted to an urbanization rate of 14% for this area in general)

49% for Wallace compared

to

53% for the region.

,

and voted

So that when compared

to

other counties in the region, Talbot County assumes characteristics common
to areas

supportive of the Republican; yet when contrasted with the state,

distinguishing traits of the

Agnew

ANALYSIS OF VARIABLES
Investigation of

vote disappear.

(Lower Eastern Shore Maryland)

Lower Eastern Shore Maryland (Dorchester, Somerset,

Wicomico, and Worcester Counties) indicates that the region voted for Mahoney

by 53% and Agnew by 45%. This region
tion of the Wallace vote (68%)

(32% versus 43% for the state)
(31%

compared

to

contrasted to 6%

compared

to 11

the state)

distinguished by a high concentra-

a low percent of white collar occupations

,

,

a high concentration of black population

18% for the state)

fo r

is

,

yrs. statewide)

,

a low percentage of foreign stock (3%

and a low median educational level
.

(9.6 yrs.

These regional characteristics correspond
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exactly to those cited earlier in our statewide analysis indicating
a preference
for the Democrat,
to

Mahoney. Simultaneously, those characteristics common

areas demonstrating support for the

region.

(See statewide

Republican

Agnew candidacy

SES factors common

those regions voting

to

.

Noteworthy,
44% for Mahoney.

a single county (Wicomico) voted 53% for

is that

This particular county

is

level ($8700

collar

compared

compared

to

$7400 for the region)

to 9.6 for the area)

workers (36% compared

tion of the Wallace vote (62%

to

,

,

,

a higher

a higher

to

median income

median educational

a higher percentage of white

32% for the region)

compared

Agnew and

featured by a lower percent black

population (25% compared to 31% for the region)

level (10.8

are absent in this

,

and a lower concentra-

68% for the area)

.

Relative to region,

then, SES characteristics of Wicomico County suggest a candidate preference
for

Agnew. Relative

Mahoney.

In short,

such factors indicate a preference

to the state,

if

an attempt

made

is

to

study electoral behavior in

Wicomico County (and the aforementioned case
an evaluation of political behavior
counties' respective regions (i.e.

is

for

of

Talbot County)

,

then such

best approached relative to these

Upper and Lower Eastern Shore Mary-

land) as opposed to the state as a whole.

A summary

of findings, both statewide

following characteristics of the

and by region, indicate the

Agnew and Mahoney

support.

129

THE ENTIRE STATE (Agnew

50%,

Mahoney

(Characteristics Indicative of Support for the
a)

b)
c)

d)
e)

b)
c)

d)
e)

higher median educational level
lower concentration of the Wallace vote
high concentration of foreign stock
high percent urban
lower percent blue collar

52%,

(Characteristics Indicative of Support for the

b)
c)

*

Mahoney Candidacy)

high concentration of the Wallace vote
low percent white collar occupations
high percent black population
low concentration of foreign stock
lower median educational level

WESTERN MARYLAND (Agnew

a)

^

Agnew Candidacy)

(Characteristics Indicative of Support for the
a)

40%)

Mahoney

37)

Agnew Candidacy

)

lower concentration of the Wallace vote
lower concentration of black population
other factors indicating support for the Republican are not present

PIEDMONT MARYLAND (Agnew

50%,

(Characteristics Ind ic ative of Support for the

Mahoney

43%)

Agnew Candidacy

)

lower concentration of the W allace vote
b) lower percent black population
c) other factors indicating support for the Republican are not present
:

a)

BALTIMORE METROPOLITAN AREA (Mahoney
(Characteristics Indica tive of Support fo r th e
a)

b)
c)

45%,

Agnew

42%)

Manoney Candidacy

)

high concentration of the Wallace vote (exclusive of Baltimore City)
high percentage black population
other factors indicating support for the Democrat are not present
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SOUTHERN MARYLAND (Mahoney

57%,

(Characteristics Indicative of Support for the

Agnew

41%)

Maho ney Candidacy)

high concentration of the Wallace vote
high concentration of black population
low percent foreign stock
other characteristics indicating support for the Democrat are not present

a)

b)
c)

d)

WASHINGTON, D.C. SUBURBAN AREA

(Agnew

(Characteristics Indicative of Support for the

63%,

Mahoney

33%)

Agnew Cand id acy

higher median educational level
lower concentration of the Wallace vote
high concentration of foreign stock
high concentration of urbanization
lower percent blue collar

a)

b)
c)

d)
e)

UPPER EASTERN SHORE MARYLAND (Mahoney
(Characteristics Indicative of Support for the
a)

b)
c)

d)
e)

b)

d)
e)

45)

high concentration of the Wallace vote
low percent white collar occupations
high percent black population
low concentration of foreign stock
lower median educational level

(Characteristics Indicative of Support for the

c)

Agnew

Mahoney Candidacy)

LOWER EASTERN SHORE MARYLAND (Mahoney

a)

51%,

high concentration of the Wallace vote
low percent white collar occupations
high concentration black population
low concentration of foreign stock
lower median educational level

53%,

Agnew

45)

Mahoney Candidacy

)
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Where the Mahoney vote

concerned, we make the following conclu-

is

sions based upon our analysis.

"Percent vote for Wallace" and "percent

black" population appear as the most significant variables in a regional
analysis of candidate preference.

Only these variables remain constant

throughout treatment of each particular area, as indicators
behavior.

For example, a key indicator

of

such electoral

support for the Democratic can-

didate (illustrated by our analysis of the entire state)

educational level.

of

This characteristic was common

,

is

to the

a lower

median

Upper and Lower

Eastern Shore regions, respectively (and these areas indeed voted Democratic).

However,

this distinguishing trait

politan Area,

was not common with the Baltimore Metro-

where the median educational

state as a whole, or

level

was greater than

that for the

Southern Maryland, where educational level was constant

with the state, (yet both regions demonstrated a support for Mahoney)
addition, a low concentration of foreign stock

"Mahoney regions."

In

is

common

.

In

to but three of four

sum, only percent vote for Wallace and percent black

remain as universal indicators

of candidate preference

where the Mahoney

vote is concerned

Where the Agnew vote

is

analyzed, the more significant variables,

again, are percent vote for Wallace and percent black population.

Note that

percent black was not one of the five "key" variables cited in our statewide
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survey
for an
to

of characteristics

R Square Change

common

of

to the

only .00119.

Agnew

vote.

This variable accounted

Yet only this variable, in addition

percent vote for Wallace, remain as constant identifiers

of the

Agnew

support.

Piedmont Maryland, for example, preferred Agnew yet

this region is

characterized by a lower rate of urbanization and constant rates

occupations, median education, and foreign stock (relative

of

blue collar

to the state)

.

Investigation of statewide data reveals that a low concentration of urbanization is a factor typical of support for

Mahoney. So

that, as

was the case

concerning the support for Mahoney, only percent black and percent vote
for Wallace universally account for voting preference in consideration of the

Agnew candidacy.
The significance

of these

variables with disregard)
in the election.

In

,

two particular variables (not treating other

has implications for the issue

of

open occupancy

assuming a positive association between the 1964 Wallace

vote and a preference for "segregationist policy" on domestically-oriented
civil rights issues, along with the positive relationship

black and favorable white voter reaction

to the

Mahoney candidacy, OPEN

HOUSING APPEARS TO HAVE BEEN A SALIENT ISSUE

NATORIAL ELECTION

.

Reference

to the initial

between percent

IN

THE

1966

GUBER-

discussion of candidate
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Mahoney single-issue oriented

strategies in the election (in particular, the

campaign)

,

in addition to respective organizational support,

advance the validity
of candidate

of this assertion.

Thus

preference was the perception

a

key factor

of the

to

in the determination

Democrat Mahoney as an

anti-open occupancy candidate and the Republican

pro-open housing policy alternative.

appear

Agnew

as a moderate-to-
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MARYLAND COUNTIES BY "ECONOMIC AREA"
%WALL %BK MINC

MEDU %BC

Western Maryland
Allegany
Garrett

%FS %UR %RU

%WC %MA %AG

10

*

7029

10.4

63

*

26

73

36

37

52

32

5

10554

11.0

55

6

34

66

45

43

50

53

29

9128

11.0

52

5

12

88

48

57

41

21

8078

10.0

66

3

14

75

34

51

45

31

7441

9.6

67

3

24

75

32

53

45

22

10791

11.0

47

11

85

14

52

45

42

14580

14.0

28

17

SI

9

72

33

63

Maryland Piedmont
Carroll

Frederick
Harford

Howard
Washington
Southern Maryland
Calvert
Charles
St.

Mary's

Upper Eastern Shore
Caroline
Cecil

Kent

Queen Anne's
Talbot

53

Lower Eastern Shore
Dorchester
Somerset
Wicomico
Worcester

68

Baltimore Metropolitan
Baltimore County
Baltimore City

Anne Arundel

42

Washington, D.C. Su burban

Montgomery
Prince Georges

KEY.

.

29

13

designates less than 1%
.percent vote for Wallace
.percent black population
%BK.
MINC .median income
MEDU. .median educational level
percent blue collar
%BC.
%Wall

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.percent foreign stock
percent urban
percent rural
%WC percent white collar
%MA. .percent vote for Mahoney
%AG. percent vote for Agnew

%FS.

.

%UR.
%RU.

.

.

.

.

.

CHAPTER

V

THE ISSUE STATUS OF OPEN OCCUPANCY

Chapter Five proposes
in the 1966 election.

to

determine the "issue status"

open occupancy

Simultaneously, from a theoretical perspective, the

role of this issue in the determination of electoral behavior
In addressing the
of a central thesis

of

is

examined.

above questions, we concern ourselves with criticism

presented

in

The People's Choice

*
.

The key concept

this presentation is the "Index to Political Predisposition," i.e.

in

evaluation

of

voters' SES levels, occupation, religion, and residence, in order to determine
political party preference.

Inherent

the belief that electoral preference

is

totally the result of party identification.

is

Issues merely account for secondary

political affect as they reinforce party partisanship

Authors Lazarsfeld, Berelson and Gaudet,
Political Predisposition concept,

address the effects

forcement," and "conversion" relative
implies that

(a)

in

to voting

support

cyclical relationship exists here

(c)

Index

to

of "activation," "rein9

behavior.

campaign propaganda arouses interest

accounts for increased exposure, i.e.

of the

(b)

The former term
increased interest

voters become more informed; a

attention is selective in that as interest

increases and the voter becomes aware of the campaign, political predispositions

become

significant; out of the

wide array
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of

campaign propaganda, due
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to predisposition, the voter will select available information favorable to his

party and reject that which

preference

is

is

unfavorable

based upon the voter's

The reinforcement

(d)

votes crystallize; electoral

political predisposition.

effect refers to the suggestion that the

more inter-

ested people are in the election, the more they tend to expose themselves to

propaganda

of their

own

party.

The conversion

effect

suggests that few

voters are converted to the other party via campaign propaganda, i.e.

previously implied, voters' behavior

is

based upon the Index

as

to Political

Predisposition

Chief criticism of The People's Choice originates with the study's thesis

which

fails to

recognize the possibility of a significant party cross-over

phenomenon. Where the activation
is selective,"

upon

effect is

concerned,

and that such selection similar

to state that "attention

to electoral preference, is

based

Political Predisposition, is to theoretically dismiss the affect of a salient

issue, e.g., open occupancy.
Investigation of the 1966 gubernatorial election indicates electoral

victory for the Republican,

Agnew,

Berelson,

et. al.,

cratic majority.

in a state with a 3 to

1

registered Demo-

associate Republican party identification

with areas of high white collar concentration, high rural concentration, and
Protestant affiliation (this latter factor will not be addressed due to unreadi-

ness of figures)

.

In the 1966

Maryland election, quantitative analysis

of

the
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Agnew and Mahoney
People's Choice

votes, at initial inspection, support findings of The

In other

.

words, the Republican vote was distinguished by

higher median income, higher median education, and white collar concentration, while the

collar areas.

Democratic vote was characterized by lower SES level

blue

-

However, the Washington, D.C. Standard Metropolitan Area,

containing the state's two most wealthy counties, and highly white collar in

occupation, while voting for the Republican in 1966,

by a

2 to

1

is

registered Democratic

Furthermore, the authors attribute a significant urban

margin.

concentration as an indicator of support for the Democratic party.

This

variable appears unreliable in predicting the 1966 vote given support regis-

tered for the

Agnew and Mahoney

candidacies in the Washington, D.C. and

Baltimore Metropolitan areas respectively.
traditionally Democratic since the

New

Investigation of the black vote,

Deal, indicates that 70% of this group

The purpose

earning less than $3000 a year voted Republican.
observations

is to

demonstrate the validity

preference in the 1966 gubernatorial race,
state,

was possibly based upon reaction

Such preference cannot
this case.

totally

of

of

these

our assertion that electoral

at least

within given areas

to the salient

be accounted for by

The Democrat, Mahoney, represented

open occupancy issue.

political predisposition in

the position opposed to

enforced open occupancy while the Republican, Agnew, represented

moderate stand

(as

many perceived

it)

.

The

of the

a

more

activation effect, then, did not
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universally determine voter preference.
attractive to voters opposed to open

was the alternative presented

to

The Democratic party was

occupancy while the Republican party

advocates or moderates on the issue.

Voter

preference was based upon this dichotomy.
Quantitative analysis of the 1966 election demonstrated, for example,

an attraction for the Democrat in areas of high black concentration where a
white majority existed.

Such support appears

to

transgress degree

or rural concentration as indicators of the 1966 vote relative
that

knowledge

of

percent black population permits.

to the

We imply

urban

of

accuracy

a definite

relationship between high percent black, vote for Mahoney, and the saliency
of

open occupancy.

The

political affect of the integrated

not be accounted for given the theoretical base of

and exposure

where selection

of candidates

dependent upon

Political Predisposition.

It

was aforementioned

thesis that the
to

to

The People's Choice

campaign propaganda

is

,

solely

that the reinforcement effect incorporated the

more interested people are

expose themselves

to

housing issue can-

propaganda

in the election, the

of their

own

party.

more they tend

The Baltimore Sun

indicated that an above average 700 to 800 thousand Marylanders were

expected

to participate in

an election where "open occupancy" had

".

.

.divided

voters."

(This voting figure represented 57% of the state's eligible voters

compared

to the

44% that participated in the 1962 governor's race)

4
.

Given
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a brief county analysis,

it

is

discovered that nine traditionally Democratic

counties voted Republican in 1966.

Note that where these nine "defecting"

counties were concerned, the mean rate of voter turnout was an incredible

65% compared

to the

already unusually high 57% state figure.

to indicate the invalid

nature of the reinforcement effect

interest in an election, the greater party reinforcement)

This appears
the greater the

(i.e.

,

where

this

guber-

natorial election is concerned, and simultaneously explains at least a single,

major reason for the Republican victory

in the election.

Acceptance

reinforcement effect does not permit an accurate evaluation
party defection in a high-turnout election;

counties which crossed-over to the GOP.

of significant

(this description,

correctly evaluates the governor's race in 1966)

.

of the

we

claim,

Below, are listed the nine

Both the high-turnout and defection

phenomenons are demonstrated.

%REGISTERED

COUNTY

(D)

%VOTE

(D)

%VOTE

(R)

%VOTER

TURNOUT*
Carroll

55

42

47

67

Frederick
Harford

59

41

52

65

74

42

47

Montgomery

65

25

71

70
70

73

41

54

64

Prince Georges
Talbot
Washington

64

46

51

65

59

40

56

65
63
59

Wicomico

70

44

53

Baltimore City

83

37

47

*

compared

to state

mean

of 57%
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Close inspection indicates that where these particular Democratic counties are

concerned
average

,

Mahoney received an average

of 53% for

Agnew,

of

39% of the vote compared to an

the Republican; this despite the fact that these

counties average 67% registered Democratic!

Another problem exists

Gaudet study, relative

ment

to the

in acceptance of the Lazarsfeld, Berelson,

and

Maryland Gubernatorial Election. The reinforce-

effect claims the greater one's interest in the election, the greater the

support demonstrated for one's own party. Yet, as previously stated, the

Washington, D.C. Standard Metropolitan Area, registered majority Democratic,
voted Republican.

Given

this

support demonstrated for the opposition party,

conventional wisdom suggests that interest in this particular region would be
significantly high due to the superior rates of median education and income.
If

such wisdom

is

accepted, we have a case where party cross-over, not

reinforcement, occurred in an area demonstrating high interest in the
election--a definite challenge to the universal acceptability of the thesis

presented

Our

in

The People's Choice

.

point, again, is that the activation and reinforcement effects, as

a concept of Political Predisposition, are not universally accurate in their

evaluation of electoral behavior.

In other

words, attitudes on open occupancy

determined electoral preference for a significant number

of voters.

party identification did not totally account for such actions.

Simple

The party
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defection from the Democrats supports this assertion
to realize that

we do

not claim

The People’s Choice

Note that

.

it is

important

be invalid in evaluating

to

voter behavior in given elections, but only where the Maryland governor's

race in 1966

is

concerned (due

Political Predisposition

to the

saliency of open occupancy)

.

Indeed,

accounted for some affect in this Maryland election

also.

The

validity of the conversion effect, as universally accurate in ex-

plaining voter behavior, given previous analysis, can be quickly dismissed.

Key

to the

conversion effect thesis

campaign propaganda.

is that

This was proven not to be the case in the Maryland

election as a significant party cross-over
tion on

our part

is

that

few voters are converted by

was demonstrated. A major assump-

open occupancy was given

to

campaign propaganda;

(previous discussion of the campaigns in both the primary and general
election

would seem

to

support our stated assumption)

respect to The People's Choice

,

electoral behavior

.

In conclusion, with

was largely based upon

reaction to the open occupancy issue and not solely upon Political Predisposition

.

The phenomenons and occurrences

ial election

appear

to indicate this

cited with respect to the gubernator-

.

In consideration of the significant role assigned to open

also address the thesis presented in Voting

,

occupancy we

where only "position" issues can

account for political cleavage and partisan behavior as opposed

to "style"
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issues that result in general consensus or non-partisan dispute. 5 Position
issues are distinguished by matters of money and material power, i.e.

economic interests. Such issues have a long range time duration, result

in

tangible gains for the successful group in the conflict, and usually cannot be

made

salient

by simple party propaganda. Policy on taxation

of a position issue.

way

of life

is

an example

Style issues are characterized by matters of style, taste,

and general cultural and personal interests. This type issue

involves questions of short range time duration, opposition between various
racial and ethnic groups, and symbolic gratifications for successful groups
in the conflict.

By the above description then, open occupancy appears

classified as a style issue.

In fact,

to

be

very generally, authors Berelson,

Lazarsfeld, and McPhee assign style issue status to

all civil

rights questions.

With the classification of open occupancy as a style issue we have no argument.

However, we maintain that

this issue definitely accounted for significant

cleavage and partisan dispute in the 1966 Maryland Gubernatorial Election.

Acceptance

of the

Voting thesis denies the validity of this assertion

.

Yet

previous inspection of the Democratic primary indicated sharp disagreement

among the party's candidates over
was the difference

the open housing issue.

of opinion that ultimately,

So significant

numerous Democrats throughout

the
the state refused to support the party's nominee, George Mahoney, in

general election

.

Such lack

of

support for the Mahoney candidacy permitted
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a Republican victory

Democratic party.

,

only possible via significant defection from the

This phenomenon, we argue, demonstrates the existence

of political cleavage (via defection within the Democratic
party)

,

and partisan

dispute (via the perception by some traditional Democrats that the Republican

party offered the more desirable policy stance on open occupancy)
In the 1966 election, voters perceived

open occupancy question.

.

two distinct positions on the

The Democrat, Mahoney, was perceived

as

unequivocally opposed to enforced open occupancy and where some voters

were concerned, the candidate was an
tionist-oriented position.

attractive choice due to his segrega-

This we assume given the quantitative analysis

which indicated a positive relationship between the Mahoney vote and the
1964 vote for the Wallace candidacy.

The Republican, Agnew, was perceived
integration" (advocating open housing

cerned)

,

as an advocate of "moderate

where new developments were con-

but most significantly the candidate was perceived by some voters

as a genuine alternative to a segregationist policy on the issue.

This conclu-

sion appears valid in consideration of the significant amount of black vote

compiled by Agnew.

The Responsible

Certainly,

Electorate

is

if

the thesis associated with V.O. Key Jr.'s

accepted

,

then voters rationally decided

candidate (or party) preference based upon a perceived alternative presented

on the open occupancy question.

Note that Key views voters' actions as
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"predictable and automatic responses to campaign stimuli" (i.e., voters are

swayed by campaign propaganda

by the candidates)

initiated

.

Yet more

importantly, in explaining voter behavior, the perceptions of the behavior
of the electorate held

by

political leaders, agitators,

and activists, condition

the types of appeals politicians employ as they seek popular support.

Given Key's "echo chamber" thesis, such perceptions by politicians
the nature of

controls

INPUT

OUTPUT

affect

(public policies advocated by a party) and thereby

(the citizen's vote)

.

The people's verdict

is

no more

selective than those alternatives presented by political officials.

Where the Maryland Gubernatorial

Mahoney perceived most voters

Election of 1S66

is

as opposed to open occupancy and popular

support dependent upon the appropriate housing position.
perceived voters in favor

concerned,

(or at least tolerant) of

Likewise,

Agnew

open occupancy, and

thus, popular sanction of his candidacy necessitated a pro-to-moderate

housing policy.
presented

to

In both cases, the voter

The

to the alternatives

him

Most significantly, the argument
fools."

responded

is

advanced that "voters are not

electorate behaves as rationally and responsibly as can be ex-

pected, given the clarity of alternatives presented.

So that faced with a

choice on open housing in the Maryland Election, voters' decisions were

primarily based upon policy preference vis-a-vis this civil rights question,
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(indeed, input into the echo chamber did not permit significant voter

behavior

to

be based upon any alternative issue)

As voter preference

by

politicians)

,

is

determined by limited alternatives

such citizen behavior

Key suggests

action and inaction.

.

is

that

(initiated

likewise the result of government

government

activity (inactivity)

,

what determines prolonged support, opposition, or converts proponents
opponents or vice-versa.

is

,

or the "standpatter" (those

vote the same party in two successive elections)

moved

many

in a

of those

manner

is of

concern, the voter

that is sensible in the light of his policy wishes.

who voted

into

Whether the "switcher" (those who change party

preference within two successive elections)

who

is

for Mr.

were opposed

to

Agnew, were

at least tolerant

Mahoney (whether Democrats

or Republicans),

open occupancy while those indicating a preference
on this question.

(While

it is

Thus,

for

implied that

standpatters remain with the party (e.g. Democrats voting for Mahoney)

because they adhere

to

party policy on an issue, Key states that some voters

that tend to disagree with party stance do not switch.)

is

to

In

essence, the voter

concerned with what government has or has not done and what
do

.

With respect to the Maryland Gubernatorial Election,

voters, presented with the candidacies of Spiro

prospects

of

open occupancy.

In

sum:

proposes

we suspect

that

Agnew and George Mahoney,

were mostly concerned about what government, proposed
to the

it

to

do in relation
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a)

voters are rational and, accordingly, base electoral decision upon
their

preference of public policy
b)

the alternatives presented on public policy in addition to the issue on

which choices are offered

to the voter,

are determined by candidates'

perceptions of political positions that possess popular appeal.
this last point in

Chapter Three, where

it

was suggested

that

campaign strategy capitalized on the open occupancy issue)
So that given the Key analysis of voter behavior,

(We addressed

Mr. Mahoney's

.

a policy alternative

on integrated housing, and the significant party cross-over by voters, a
strong case

is

made

for the existence of political cleavage and partisan

behavior over a style issue in this particular election.
Berelson, et
into conflict,

it is

al.

,

additionally

comment

that

"when

style issues

come

only a question of deciding which candidate would realize

a certain goal faster

7

.

"

Acceptance of the V.O. Key, Jr. study, i.e., the

existence of voter rationality, would appear to indicate that voters perceived

some disparity on open occupancy position between the two parties. Very
simply,

it is

suggested that the Mahoney and Agnew candidacies advocated

different "ends" to the open housing question, not different "means" to

achieve an identical end, as Voting would imply.
accepted, where this particular election

is

If

the Voting thesis

concerned, a belief

that the goal of achieving immediate integration (where

is

is

necessitated

new developments are
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concerned)
that the

,

is

similar to opposition to enforced open occupancy.

above goals, representative

Agnew and Mahoney

of the

respectively, were not similar in nature

We

maintain

candidacies

Furthermore, such similarity was

not perceived by voters as indicated by their electoral behavior.
In

sum, while we agree that open occupancy

definition--as Berelson, Lazarsfeld, and

McPhee

is

indeed a style issue by

indicate,

we disagree

with

the assumed universal declaration that style issues cannot result in political

cleavage, partisan behavior, and concern only a choice
to

reach identical goals.

of alternative

The 1966 Maryland Gubernatorial

means

Election, given

the saliency of open occupancy, lends validity to our assertion.
It

was

initially

suggested that the purpose

determine the "issue status" of open occupancy

of this chapter

was

in the 1966 election.

to

We

additionally claimed this issue to be instrumental in accounting for voter

behavior and validated the assertion,

The People's Choice and Voting
to electoral behavior, as

.

in part,

by addressing shortcomings

in

Evaluation of the role of issues relative

presented in The American Voter

,

lends partial

o

support

to

our hypothesis

Admittedly

,

.

the key thesis of

The American Voter

9
is

that party

identification has a profound impact on behavior through its influence on

voter attitudes.
to

The

intensity of attitude forces upon the individual are said

determine degree of partisanship.

It

is

further suggested that due to the
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complexities of politics and government, which prohibit matters from being

common knowledge

to

voters

,

party affiliation supplies the individual with

"cues" by which politics are evaluated.

(We have claimed that the Mahoney

candidacy was judged on the open occupancy issue, and not according
simple party
rejection of

affiliation;

to

analysis of the party cross-over phenomenon in

The People's Choice

thesis addressed this matter in detail.

should be also noted, that while Mr. Mahoney

Democratic ticket was victorious

lost the election, the

It

remaining

.

Given the primary status of party identification, as that which determines voter behavior, Campbell

secondary where electoral decision
candidate

is

suggest that candidate personality

et al.

is

described as that which

concerned.

is

The

is

political role of the

unclear as to whether certain conditions

occasion the emergence of a particular individual, or the politician hastens
the arrival of particular events.

representative of his party and

In

is

any case, the candidate

judged by that label.

political role of the candidate's personality

occupancy,
of the

(It

it

viewed as the

(With respect to the

and the Mahoney position on open

appears as though certain conditions did occasion the emergence

Democra t's candidacy

was stated

is

in

was a perception

as opposed to the alternative theory offered

Chapter Three that the key
of

to

Mahoney's campaign strategy

popular support based upon a position taken on the

potentially salient open occupancy issue)

.
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^ s The American Voter assigns primary and secondary importance

to

the affect of party identification and candidate personality in the determination
of voter preference, the role of "issues" is relegated to tertiary status.

authors state that most voters lack "familiarity" with issues, i.e.
electorate is not

aware

of a particular

express an opinion on a matter.

problem or

is

effect concept associated with

Yet unlike the presentations

a salient issue such as

This

is

of

of

.

The People's Choice and Voting,

not dismiss the possibility of a

phenomenon where

for electoral behavior.

support emanating from this study.

suggest that several criteria must be met
person's vote decision.

Emphasized

In essence,

(Note the reinforce-

The Peo ple's Choice)

open occupancy can account

our chief source

is

if

an issue

is to

The authors

bear upon a

the fact that such criteria do not

assure that an issue affects electoral behavior, but the possibility

phenomenon does
requirements.

to)

In this case, voters acquaint themselves

partisan identification determines electoral preference.

The American Voter does

the

unable (doesn't care

with issues via information "screened" by the political party.

ment

The

of

such a

not exist without the issue conforming to these minimal

In order for an issue to affect the individual's voting decision,

the following conditions must exist:
the issue must be cognized in some form
b) the issue must arouse some minimal intensity of feeling
the
c) there must be some perception by voters, that one party represents
person's own position on the issue better than the other party

a)
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Investigation of the 1966 gubernatorial election suggests that open occupancy

could have theoretically determined voter preference, as the issue conforms
to the

above requirements. We submit that voters were aware

of the

open housing issue and demonstrated

cognize an issue dictates.

of the existence

definite opinions on

Certainly the Mahoney candidacy

as to

it,

itself,

given the

single-issue orientation of the Democrat's campaign, assisted in making open

occupancy

a familiar issue.

Indeed, the perceived necessity of other

candidates to unwillingly re-orient their campaign platforms

in

incorporate an open housing position, given the affect

Mahoney

of the

order

to

strategy, indicates voter awareness on this issue--at least as perceived by
the candidates

.

by voters when

The authors claim

that definite opinions will be expressed

a state of affairs, associated with an issue, is evaluated as

"good or bad," "desirable or undesirable."^ Open occupancy was
perceived in this manner by voters.

why

Analysis in Chapter One, of "reasons"

individuals preferred segregation in housing supports our claim; e.g.,

certain groups were considered undesirable neighbors due to perceived

losses in property value, increased taxes due to necessity for increased
social services, etc.

Likewise, other groups indicated the desirability for

open occupancy as a means

to

improve the possibilities

of better

housing
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The existence

of integrated

housing, then, was perceived as "good and bad,"

"desirable and undesirable" by various groups.

Reference

to

previous analysis which indicated an above average

voter turnout in the 1966 election compared to the 1962 gubernatorial race

demonstrates,
rates

at least, a

were discovered

minimal intensity

to exist

Hiah voter turnout

of feeling.

within the entire state, and particularly

within those traditional Democratic counties that defected to the GOP.
significant in evaluating the voter's potential intensity of feeling

is

Most

a recog-

nition that the absolute importance of goals (or values) is not as important

as the individual's perception of goals that will be realized and goals that
will be hindered

for the
of

under alternative policies.^ Given the support registered

Mahoney candidacy, these individuals perceived

the potential election

Republican Spiro Agnew as synonymous with enforced open occupancy

where such
existed

,

legislation

among blacks

was opposed. Where support
for

example

cy was perceived as a thwart

,

the

for the

Mahoney opposition

to the goal of integrated

of

Maryland voters

increased aid

to

in this election.

open occupan-

to

housing

dichotomy, we maintain, accurately reflects the perceptions

number

Agnew candidacy

.

This

of a significant

Issues such as tax reform,

education (and other issues which, in previous chapters,

have been referred

to as

produced an intensity

"secondary")

of feeling

,

appeared not

among voters,

to

have significantly

in that values or goals
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concerning these issues were not perceived as thwarted under alternative

by the candidates.

policies offered
in the

(See discussion of "secondary issues"

campaign, Chapters Three and Four, where position similarity

stressed

is

.

Analysis of the 1966 gubernatorial election also demonstrates that
voters did perceive one party
of

open occupancy, relative

to better

represent their position on the issue

to the other party.

It

was previously

stated

that the significant defection from the Democratic party (most evident

nine traditionally Democratic counties)

win the election
cans,

3 to 1

.

,

enabled the Republican, Agnew,

For these voters who defected, the Republican party repre-

Mahoney candidacy was perceived

lished values or goals

true for a significant

number
to

of voters

to their

own, while

as a hinder to the pursuit of estab-

concerning the issue; again,

occupancy indeed appears

this,

who crossed party

we maintain was
lines.

to the

of feeling

requirements that necessitate

among voters.

Open

have been the key issue upon which party

defection was based as other issues in the campaign theoretically

conform

to

where registered Democrats outnumber Republi-

in a state

sented a policy stand on open occupancy more similar
the

among

In other

at least a

fail to

minimal intensity

words, secondary campaign issues, we

claim, could not have significantly accounted for party defection.

153

Where Democratic party
that a policy choice on

identifiers did not cross-over,

we suggest

open occupancy was similarly perceived and

that

voters preferred the Mahoney position; again, our claims as to voter perceptions and behavior with respect to this election, are not universal in
application.

Democratic voters, then, correctly perceived that the Demo-

cratic party represented their

opposition party

key here,
the

.

The concept

in that electoral

stand on open housing better than the

of voter choice on policy alternatives is

behavior was based on the correct evaluation

Mahoney candidacy and

tive analysis

own

not simple Political Predisposition.

of

Quantita-

demonstrated a positive association between the Mahoney

vote and the Wallace vote which implies a natural attraction for the former

candidate's open occupancy position given acceptance of the Alabama

governor's segregationist platform in 1964.
Democratic that declined

two years

later.

to

Other regions traditionally

support Wallace, also did not support Mahoney

In addition, those

economic areas that voted for Mahoney

in the general election also cast support for the candidate in the primary.

Surely, electoral preference for Mahoney in the Democratic primary indicates
a preference for an anti-open housing position given the single-issue

orientation of the candidate and our previous analysis.
that did not support

Republican.

Mahoney

Those Democrats

in the primary, for the most part, voted

So that where open occupancy was concerned, voters perceived
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that one party represented the person's

own

position on the issue better

than the opposition party.
In conclusion, analysis of

The American Voter

thesis indicates that

FOR AN EXTENSIVE NUMBER OF VOTERS, open occupancy

could have

determined electoral preference in the 1966 gubernatorial election. Note
that the possible significance of party identification is net discounted

though we claim for

it

a secondary role.

valid, given the support of the

Our assertion appears additionally

Key study and the shortcomings

People's Choice and Voting theses.

of

The

CONCLUSION

Very simply, our thesis implies
accounted for a significant degree
Gubernatorial Election.

of electoral

occupancy issue

preference in the 1966 Maryland

This conclusion has been validated by methods

which served as the body
1)

that the salient open

of

our chapter presentations.

were found

Definite attitudes on integrated housing

to exist

among voters,

and such attitudes were represented by politicians.
2)

Verbal and quantitative analysis

support with respect

to the

of candidates'

campaigns and voter

primary and general election demonstrated the

significance of open occupancy in determining electoral preference.
3)

Open housing was discovered

as a possible determinant of electoral

preference given the issue's compliance with minimum theoretical require-

ments established by The American Voter

.

Note that the possible affect of party identification upon voters' choice
is not

denied in this election, yet we believe, given an aggregate evaluation

of this thesis presentation, that the salient

explains

much

of the

open occupancy issue significantly

variance in the 1966 governor's vote.
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